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Abstract 
 
Taiwan’s modern history of rapid economic growth has given the country the 
reputation as the “Taiwan Miracle”. The country’s emphasis on economic growth has 
become a core tenet of the nation’s policies and attitudes, both domestically and on the 
international scale.  However, Taiwan’s 1996 No Haste Policies, which deeply 
restricted foreign investment into China, are a notable divergence from the country’s 
historic favoritism towards liberalized economic policies. This thesis seeks to identify 
what forces were behind Taiwan’s No Haste policies implemented between 1996 and 
2001 and why these restrictive investment policies were broadly championed by a 
Taiwanese society that had historically championed all efforts towards economic 
growth. I ultimately argue that these economic policies were not a function of 
economic rationalism, but rather a result of Taiwan’s growing nationalist movement 
facilitated through its democratization process. Taiwan’s societal memory of atrocity 
and its newfound ability to redefine its national identity separate from its colonial past 
fueled the nation’s efforts to sacrifice economic wellbeing to protect the nation’s 
ontological security. Ultimately, I find that the restrictions represented Taiwan’s 
attempts to assert its autonomous identity from China. 
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Introduction 
 
Theories of international relations contend that interactions among states are 
based on set factors. For realists, the pursuit of capital and power shape state 
relationships, and the actions of governments can be traced back selfish pursuit of 
wealth or power.1 Through this lens, wars and security dilemmas are inevitable 
components of international relations because states continuously seek relative power 
over others. Liberal theories of international relations contend that while states do base 
their interactions with one another on the pursuit of capital and power, states are 
constrained by their constituents and institutions from engaging in violent acts with 
other states, thus peace and cooperation can exist between nations.2 These theories 
assume that states have homogenous and fixed preferences.  
However, these prominent theories fail to account for the more varied interests 
and priorities that exist within states today. In examining global conflicts, security 
dilemmas, cooperative agreements, and alliances, it becomes apparent that both 
disagreements and partnerships between states are based on a variety of factors outside 
of wealth accumulation or the pursuit of relative power. In addition, these theories are 
based on the assumption that national priorities are static. In reality, state interactions 
                                                
1 Robert E. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. “Power and Interdependence” in Conflict 
After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. (Routledge: New York, 
1997); Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1981.)   
2 Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton, 2001. 
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and relationships shift in their relative strength and nature over time due to changes in 
preferences.  
In order to fully understand interactions between nations, it is important to 
account for the variety of priorities that states hold at different times, and approach 
analysis with an understanding that decisions and interactions between states vary in 
relation to the salience of a variety of priorities to a state’s national identity. In 
addition, proper analysis must account for the willingness of states to pursue 
simultaneous policy objectives that appear contradictory to one another or even self-
harming.  
 But what priorities outside of physical and economic security do states hold? 
And what shapes the decision-making process in nations so that economic well-being 
or physical security are sidelined for other priorities?  As globalization makes 
interaction between states more frequent, significant, and necessary, understanding 
how and why nations make decisions that appear self-harming is critical, both for 
creating a more nuanced comprehension of state interactions and for constructing 
policy solutions to global issues.  
Research Question 
As an extension of these concepts, this thesis uses the island nation of Taiwan 
as a case study to understand the ways that decisions which harm economic wellbeing 
are justified and championed within states. My research question is—What facilitated 
economic policies within Taiwan that restricted investments into China between 1996 
and 2001, and why were these policies championed by Taiwanese citizens, despite the 
fact that they disproportionately harmed the Taiwanese economy? In presenting 
 3 
Taiwan as a case study, I hope to explore methods of analysis that can potentially 
provide a framework for interpreting policy decisions in other countries which defy 
conventional liberal or realist logic.  
Case Study: Taiwan 
 
In 1997, following Taiwan’s National Development Conference, the “No 
Haste” policies were passed with near unanimous support from all sides of the 
political spectrum. These policies drastically increased regulation of foreign 
investments into China, Taiwan’s top trading partner and largest source of outward 
FDI. Championed as an initiative to protect national sovereignty, the No Haste 
policies aimed to reduce Taiwan’s dependence on China’s labor markets.3 However, 
more foundationally, I argue these policies represented an attempt to assert national 
autonomy by a Taiwanese nation that had experienced diplomatic and political 
isolation due to China’s successful attempts to deny the nation its Taiwan’s 
sovereignty. 	
In choosing to sacrifice economic wellbeing, it is clear that the Taiwanese were 
prioritizing security of another type.  This project will explore why the Taiwanese 
willingly subjected themselves to economic harm, and what structural components of 
Taiwanese society facilitated this. I argue that Taiwan’s collective memory of 
colonialism and atrocity after generations of repression produced the construction of a 
national identity that demanded primacy in domestic and international policy. I then 
posit that democratization provided the foundation upon which Taiwan’s identity 
                                                
3 Syaru Shirley Lin. Taiwan's China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple 
Interests in Taiwan's Cross-Strait Economic Policy. Stanford, (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2016). 
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movement could operationalize, and finally, I conclude by arguing that the malleable 
nature of democracy and national identity allow policies and attitudes to shift over 
time without sacrificing the core tenets of a nation’s ontological security.	
Background 
 
 The history of the Taiwanese people is one riddled with suppression and 
colonialism. From the 17th century to 1987, the Taiwanese people were successively 
occupied or controlled by the Dutch, Spanish, Japanese, and the Kuomintang (KMT) 
Chinese Nationalists. The KMT ruled Taiwan from 1945 until democratization in 
1987. Chiang Kai-Shek, the central figure of the KMT, had led the fight against 
communist leaders in the Chinese civil war, and eventually retreated to Taiwan. 
Chiang Kai-Shek and his nationalist party claimed authority not only of Taiwan, but 
Mainland China as well. His regime aimed to eliminate all elements of Taiwanese 
identity through indoctrination and subjugation. The duration of Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
leadership is often referred to as the White Terror, because Taiwanese elite and 
dissenters were systematically slaughtered or disappeared.4 His death in 1975 initiated 
the democratization process within Taiwan. In 1986, opposition parties were legalized, 
and the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) emerged in opposition the KMT.  
 Central to Taiwan’s democratization experience was the reemergence of a 
nationalist movement, whose members fiercely advocated for Taiwan’s status as an 
independent nation separate from Mainland China. Much of the movement was fueled 
by resentment of the KMT’s repressive 42-year martial law.5 Mirroring Taiwan’s 
                                                
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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peaceful and quick transition into democracy, Taiwan’s economic growth was rapid. 
Between 1953 and 1990, Taiwan’ industrial output as a percentage of GDP grew from 
19.7% to 42.3%.6 Similarly, Taiwan’s level of inequality mirrors that of highly 
developed European nations.7 Frequently referred to as ‘The Taiwan Miracle” 
Taiwan’s ascent into a modernized capitalist economy, along with its peaceful 
democratization make its modern political and economic growth a significant source 
of study for development economists and policymakers.8 
 Lee Teng-Hui won the presidency in 1988. Despite his membership in the 
KMT party, Lee’s dedication to the Taiwanese people was strong and his commitment 
to reform was central to his platform. In 1995, Lee gave a speech at his alma mater, 
Cornell University. In his speech he famously spoke, “Some say that it is impossible 
for us to break out of the diplomatic isolation we face, but we will do our utmost to 
demand the impossible."9 In addition to advocating for diplomatic recognition, Lee 
emphasized the Taiwanese people’s desire to be recognized as an independent state.10 
The Chinese responded strongly to Lee’s comments by sparking the Taiwan Strait 
                                                
6 Tien Hung-Mao, and Shiau Chyuan-Jeng. "Taiwan's Democratization: A 
Summary." World Affairs 155, no. 2 (1992): 58-61. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672340. 
7 Richard E. Barrett, and Martin King Whyte. "Dependency Theory and Taiwan: 
Analysis of a Deviant Case." American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 5 (1982): 1064-
089. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778418. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Cornell University Alumni Reunion,” C-Span, June 9, 1995. Accessed December 
13, 2017. https://www.c-span.org/video/?65610-1/cornell-university-alumni-reunion. 
10 David W. Chen, “Taiwan’s President Tiptoes Around Politics at Cornell,” The New 
York Times, June 10, 1995. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/world/taiwan-s-
president-tiptoes-around-politics-at-cornell.html. 
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Crisis of 1995. China’s missile strikes over the strait sparked global fears of a war 
between the nations, and struck fear into the Taiwanese people.  
 While cross-strait economic relations were already precarious, China’s military 
drills led Lee to formulate the National Development Conference (NDC) in order to 
reformulate cross-strait policy in response to the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The new 
policies most prominently included intense economic restrictions on Chinese goods 
and FDI into the Mainland. These economic restrictions, known as the “No Haste” 
policies, were met with significant support across the political spectrum.11 
 However, Taiwan’s small size and lack of internal markets had historically 
made China a significant source of Taiwanese investments. In comparison, China’s 
economy has consistently been more diversified. Thus, the No Haste Policies 
presumably disproportionately hurt the Taiwanese economy.  As a state that has 
prioritized economic growth for decades, these policies contradict professed 
fundamental Taiwanese values.12 These restrictions towards China were a sharp 
departure from all policies directed towards every other nation on the planet. 
Similarly, these policies were easily implemented without significant opposition from 
either side of the political spectrum. This departure from established norms signifies 
that there are other components of Taiwanese identity that are more foundational than 
pursuit of economic growth and whose significance transcends all forms of party 
allegiance.  
Framework and Scope  
 
                                                
11 Lin. Taiwan's China Dilemma. 
12 World Values Survey, Wave 3: Taiwan, 1995. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp 
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 This project differs from state-centric approaches to political economy, in that 
I adhere to the concept that the state is a reflection of society rather than a separate 
entity with an agenda disassociated from the polis. This framework is adopted from 
constructivism, in which international relations is viewed as “social rather than strictly 
material”.13 As an extension of this, my analysis posits that policymaking, identity 
formation, and democratization are all a function of a socially constructed society, 
whereby members of a nation constitute their realities via socialization. As an 
extension of this premise, states interact with one another in the same manner. 
Behaviors are not a function of cost-benefit analysis, as realists might pose, but of a 
social structure and the reinforcement of this structure via interactions between states. 
This approach to understanding political economy between states is more nuanced 
than realist or institutionalist theory because it doesn’t presuppose a set of rational 
actions. Behaviors are not a result of exogenous factors, but of endogenous social 
constraints, conceived of by the state itself.14 In this way, a constructivist approach 
asserts that identity and interests are malleable, and adjustments in behavior are a 
result of a shift in interests.15  
 This project will analyze Taiwan’s relationship with China between 
democratization in 1987 and 2001.  I have chosen this time period because it captures 
                                                
13 Alexander Wendt. "Constructing International Politics." International Security 20, 
no. 1 (1995): 71-81.  
14 John Gerard Ruggie. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge." International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 
855-85.  
15 Alexander Wendt. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of 
Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764. 
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initial interactions between the two nations after the Taiwanese garnered self-
determination via democracy, as well as 2 shifts in economic policy toward China. 
The project will analyze the No Haste policies developed in 1996, as well as the 2001 
election of Chen Shui-bian and resultant liberalization of trade across the strait. This 
time period is significant because it captures behaviors and rhetoric within Taiwan as 
its people first began to grapple with understanding their nation’s role in relation to 
China and the globe.  
However, examining events within Taiwan prior to democratization is 
absolutely essential to analyzing behaviors, attitudes, and policies. I will make 
frequent reference to formative events under KMT autocracy because the Taiwanese 
people frequently make reference to this time period when justifying behaviors. 
Memory plays a significant part in the Taiwanese people’s conception of their present 
political and economic circumstances, and it will be a prominent component of my 
analysis.  
Significance 
 
This project leverages theory on ontological security and uses it in a political 
economy setting. Literature on economic protectionism often accounts for the 
financial impact of protectionist trade policies or how protectionist investment 
climates impact economic growth, but little has been done to explore the origins of 
these protectionist policies outside of economic rationality.16 By exploring Taiwan’s 
                                                
16 Réka Juhász. “Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the 
Napoleonic Blockade.” CEP discussion paper, CEPDP1322. Centre for Economic 
Performance (2004), London, UK.; Robert C. Feenstra “How Costly is 
Protectionism?” Journal on Economic Perspectives. 6, No 3. (1992): 159-178; Jo 
Jakobsen and G. Jakobsen Tor. "Economic Nationalism and FDI: The Impact of 
 9 
No Haste policies through an ontological security lens, this project offers insight into 
the root causes of policies that seem counterintuitive and what motivates individuals to 
champion them. Ontological security theory accounts for the tendency of states to act 
in ways that appear self-harming, and thus provides a new perspective in 
understanding international political economy.  
Taiwan’s status as a postcolonial state and a highly developed industrial nation 
make the findings of this project significant for both developing nations and those with 
advanced economies. As postcolonial nations around the globe grapple with 
formulating a new state-identity, in relation to themselves, their previous colonial 
power, and the rest of the world, these states must also configure themselves within 
the global economy. Despite the nation’s ‘miraculous’ advances over the last 40 years, 
issues of identity assertion and political economy are central to Taiwan’s international 
and domestic policies. Thus, understanding Taiwan’s identity-conceptualization can 
offer a potential framework for discerning the justification behind the policy-making 
within other postcolonial, developing states. According to Benedict Anderson, “If 
people imagined the proletariat merely as a group in hot pursuit of refrigerators, 
holidays, or power, how far would they, including members of the proletariat, be 
willing to die for it?”17 In this way, it is important to understand how political 
                                                
Public Opinion on Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Markets, 1990-2005." 
Society and Business Review 6, no. 1 (2011/02/08 2011): 61-76.; Sonal S. Pandya 
"Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the 
Twenty-First Century." Annual Review of Political Science 19, no. 1 (2016/05/11 
2016): 455-75. 
17 Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities. (New York: Verso, 1983). 
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movements and policies are often a function of values that are significantly more 
foundational than economic security or physical safety. 
In addition, as 21st century populist movements emerge within developed 
nations with rhetoric similar to that of Lee Teng-Hui’s “Taiwan First” agenda, looking 
towards Taiwan’s experience in protectionist policy-making is helpful. If policies and 
rhetoric are a function of social construction rather than self-evident rationality, then 
the international community can benefit from identifying the root sources of these 
movements in order to best address them.  
Chapter Overview 
 
 This first chapter of this project will begin by looking at theories of economic 
integration and dependence. It will then compare these theories to the experience of 
Taiwan post-democratization. Particularly, it will examine Taiwan’s restrictive 
policies towards China following the Taiwan Strait Crisis and the evolution of those 
policies over time. It will use data on FDI between Taiwan and China to quantify the 
effects of these policies.  The second chapter will examine the role of nationalism and 
identity conceptualization in forming these economic policies. The third chapter will 
establish how Taiwan’s democratization experience facilitated their distinct nationalist 
movement, which led to the formation of these identity-preserving policies. Finally, 
the last chapter will review the role of nationalism and democracy in forming policies 
that appear self-harming and explore how the evolving nature of identity and public 
interest allow for oscillating economic policies.    
 11 
Chapter 1: Economic Protectionism 
 
 This chapter will explore theories regarding economic integration between 
states and situate Taiwan’s experience within the global economy since 
democratization in 1987. It will then examine the implications of the 1996 National 
Development Conference and the resulting policies that sharply increased regulation 
of investments into China. It will demonstrate that these policies had a significant 
impact on the nation’s total investments and that the nature of these policies indicate 
that contrary to some prevailing political economy theory, identity contestation placed 
a greater constraint on the Taiwanese state than economic security in the aftermath of 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis. Finally, this chapter will explore Taiwan’s shift in economic 
attitudes towards the PRC in 2001, and offer explanation for the change.  
Dependent States 
 
Dependency theory frames smaller, less developed nations as peripheral to the 
ambitions of larger, more powerful states.18 The stronger states, referred to as core 
states, have “strong state machinery coupled with a national culture…[that] serves 
both as a mechanism to protect disparities within the world-system.”19 The economic 
power of the core states provides them with the ability to maintain the disparities 
between dominant, core states and periphery states. Within the world economy, 
periphery states lack the occupational skills and the ability to capitalize on resources in 
                                                
18 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. World-systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004. 
19 Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture 
and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: 
Academic Press, 1976, 229-233.  
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order to challenge the world system.20  According to Wallerstein, this disparity 
between core and periphery states is relatively static because core states have the 
power and ability to sustain their dominance and “the forces of the marketplace 
reinforce rather than undermine them.”21 In these frameworks, relative economic 
superiority is the primary determinant of political relations between nations. In 
addition, dependency theory heavily relies on the presumption of social structures 
within individual states, which perpetuate inequality and drive the means of 
production within these peripheral and semi-peripheral states. In this frame, capital is 
the sole determinant of interactions between societal classes within a state.  
But this theory fails to capture both the nuances of nation-states as structures 
and the function of state relationships within the global economy. The presumption 
that capital is consistently the primary determinant of relationships between developed 
and underdeveloped states is inaccurate. Dependency theory fails to account for the 
variety of axes upon which states define their relationships, particularly national 
identity. In addition, whether or not state-sponsored economic actions are driven by 
financial selfishness, dependency theory fails to consider that economic interactions 
between states aren’t always exploitive, and that “economic investment is not a zero-
sum game.”22 Finally, this theory fails to see that economic relations aren’t always an 
end in themselves, but can also function as means to an end.  
Taiwan as a Dependent State 
 
                                                
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Richard E. Barrett and Martin King Whyte. "Dependency Theory and Taiwan: 
Analysis of a Deviant Case." American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 5 (1982): 1064-
89. 
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Taiwan’s location, colonialist experience, and lack of natural resources make it 
appear as a quintessential case study for dependent states. However, despite its 
characteristics, Taiwan’s economic development and deviance from dependency 
theory has often earned it the title as the “Taiwan Miracle”. Shortly after World War 
II, Taiwan began receiving large quantities of foreign aid from the United States in 
order to support the island in defense efforts and to improve the post-war economy.23  
During this time period, the nation’s economy grew significantly and shifted from 
mainly agrarian exports to manufacturing exports.24 In addition, a significant land 
reform program allowed the Taiwanese tenant farmers to own their own farms through 
government loans, instilling the prevailing tradition of strong property rights within 
the island.25 Despite the KMT’s repressive governance style, their focus on economic 
growth helped propel Taiwan into a nation with a highly advanced economy by the 
1970s, with a gini coefficient similar to that of highly developed European nations.26  
Taiwan’s mode of economic growth, along with the other Asian Tiger 
economies—South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—differ from the liberal 
tradition of economic growth.27 These economies have advanced in the global 
economic sphere through their high savings rates and an export economy. The Asian 
                                                
23 David W. Chang "U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan." Asian Survey 5, no. 
3 (1965): 152-60. 
24 Kerry Brown, Justin Hempson-Jones, and Jessica Pennisi. Investment Across the 
Taiwan Strait: How Taiwan’s Relationship with China Affects its Position in the 
Global Economy. November 2014. 
25 Chang, “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan.” 
26 Barrett and Whyte, “Dependency Theory and Taiwan” 
27 H. Shie Vincent and D. Meer Craig. "The Rise of Knowledge in Dependency 
Theory: The Experience of India and Taiwan." Review of Radical Political Economics 
42, no. 1 (2010/03/01 2010): 81-99. 
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economic model is founded on Confucian principles, where societies value posterity 
over immediate gratification and work for their families and their honor, rather than 
for themselves as individuals.28 The success of these countries outside of the typical 
structural processes of development insinuates that a country’s ability to create 
economic growth is not dependent on external predetermined factor endowments and 
that growth is not strictly linear. 
An integral component of dependency theory is that resource inequality 
between nations perpetuates dependency and threatens the sovereignty of the smaller 
state. Taiwan does lack the variety of natural resources that China possesses, but since 
the mid 20th century, their economy has grown tremendously, based on non-natural-
resource commodities, including technologies and services.29  In addition, while 
Taiwan’s sovereignty has been of significant contestation, this has not prevented the 
island from garnering international support—even if unofficial. While the Chinese 
have led efforts to deny Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition and vetoed all efforts to 
introduce a separate Taiwanese state into the UN, The U.S. provided support to 
Taiwan during the 1995 missile crisis by providing weapons and defense systems.30 
Similarly, Taiwan has quasidiplomatic with numerous other Western powers, through 
its 20 diplomatic missions.31 These missions function as embassies, where the heads of 
                                                
28 Kazimierz Z, Poznanski, "Confucian Economics: The World at Work," World 
Review of Political Economy 6, no. 2 (2015): 208-51. 
doi:10.13169/worlrevipoliecon.6.2.0208. 
29 Thomas Gold. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. New York: Armonk, 1986.   
30 Barrett and Whyte, “Dependency Theory and Taiwan” 
31 Erik Pajtinka. “Between Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy: Taiwan’s Foreign 
Relations in Current Practice,” Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language 
Politics. 11, no. 2 (2017): 39-57. https://doi.org/10.1515/jnmlp-2017-0003 
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the missions are referred to as ambassadors. One of these missions is also stationed in 
Geneva, Switzerland and functions as Taiwan’s mission to the World Trade 
Organization. This indicates that state leaders might hold allegiance to the PRC out of 
economic necessity, but their verbal commitment to China has not kept the Taiwanese 
state from being fully incorporated into the global economic system.  
Similarly, Taiwan might be viewed as the archetype for a dependent state 
because the Chinese have made repeated efforts to ensure Taiwan becomes more 
dependent upon China in order for Taiwan to succeed economically. This is most 
notably seen in China’s special economic zones along its southern coastal boarder, 
where Taiwanese investors face more favorable tax climates.32 In addition, although 
the Chinese have insisted within international trade and climate change agreements 
that the PRC is in fact not a developed country, the size of its markets and labor pool 
have made it one of the most prominent and influential economies on the planet.33 The 
fact that China was able to successfully campaign for Taiwan’s removal from the UN 
is a notable example of the power China has both diplomatically and economically. 
Thus, China’s significance in the global economy, matched with Taiwan’s small size 
and lack of diversity in its economy, creates a dependent relationship, whereby 
Taiwan’s economic success is deeply tied to its relationship with China. 
Despite China’s position as the more powerful state in multiple regards within 
the China-Taiwan relationship, both states have historically deviated from their 
                                                
32 David K. Y. Chu. “The Special Economic Zones of China and Their Impact on Its 
Economic Development.” The China Quarterly 158 (1999): 496-97.  
33 Yiping Huang, “China is a Special Developing Country.” The New York Times.  
July 27, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/27/can-china-stand-
on-its-own/china-is-a-special-developing-country 
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prescribed roles as core and periphery. Taiwan’s economy is deeply dependent on 
China, with a significant portion of capital dependent on Chinese markets.34 In fact, 
between 1991 and 2002, 44% of Taiwan’s investments abroad were in China, where 
large Taiwanese companies rely on Chinese markets for heavy industry and consumer 
goods.35 However, in times of tense political standoff, China does not leverage 
Taiwan’s economic dependence for political gain, as realist logic would predict. 
Instead, the Chinese have responded with purely militaristic shows of power, which 
included missile strikes across the strait, naval exercises, and the mobilization of 
troops in Xiaman, a coastal province directly across from Taiwan.36 Similarly, during 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Taiwanese made efforts to minimize their dependence on 
Chinese markets by passing significant restrictions on economic interactions across 
the strait, even though these restrictions disproportionately impacted the Taiwanese 
economy. These actions defy dependency theory assumptions. Neither the Chinese nor 
Taiwanese government act in the most economically efficient ways in order to protect 
sovereignty. Instead, the Chinese fail to fully leverage their global economic 
prominence by retaliating against Taiwan’s independence movement with hard-hitting 
economic sanctions or restrictions, and the Taiwanese continue to promote their 
conception of a separate Taiwanese state via economic restrictions, despite the fact 
that economic wellbeing is sacrificed in the process. These actions indicate that for the 
                                                
34 Barrett and Whyte, “Dependency Theory and Taiwan.” 
35 Ezra N. H. Chen. “The Economic Integration of Taiwan and China and Its 
Implications for Cross-strait Relations.” Projects at Harvard, Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs (2003/07). 
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/chen.pdf  
36 Andrew Scobell. “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 
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Chinese and Taiwanese people, financial security is not always the most prominent 
value when establishing inter-state relationships and that there are other significant 
variables outside of economics involved in determining how both states operate in 
relation to one another. The aim of this thesis is to explore what other factors are 
involved in Taiwanese decision-making that has led to policy towards China.   
The economic determinism described within dependency theory denies 
societies agency in establishing their interactions with other states. By attributing 
growth, or lack of growth, to exogenous characteristics, states are reduced to mere 
economic entities, where institutions, governance, and societal priorities are ignored. 
Taiwan’s growth experience, as well as its relationship with China, indicates that these 
characteristics offer as much insight into economic development as does the external 
arbitrary designation of ‘peripheral’ or ‘underdeveloped’.     
Trade and Peace under Realism and Liberalism 
 
  While dependency theory posits relationships between states as one of 
exploitation and dominance, both liberal theories argue that pursuit of economic gain 
can actually lead to cooperation. Realists and liberal theorists arrive at differing 
conclusions, both of these positions presume that economic security is the principle 
foundation upon which state decisions are made and interstate relationships are 
developed.  
The concept of perpetual peace, a cornerstone of liberal theory,  made famous 
by Immanuel Kant, asserts that economic interdependence ultimately leads to peace 
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between nations.37 The need for financial security constrains state leaders from waging 
war because economic integration expands the non-military interests of states.38 By 
increasing the complexity upon which political decisions are made, economic 
interdependence doesn’t abolish conflict, but simply expands the costs associated with 
warfare.39 
 However, this theory is most applicable for relationships between 2 democratic 
states, where leaders of both nations are mutually held accountable by their 
constituents. For relationships between autocratic and democratic states, democratic 
nations are constrained by the demands of citizens, while an autocratic leader is not. In 
this way, democracy can become an inherent liability, because costs are less 
significant for leaders not constrained by popular opinion.40 This theory is also applied 
to dyadic relationships, and fails to consider the complexity of alliances between 
multiple states.   
While economic integration between Taiwan and China has steadily increased 
since 1987 and there has not been an outbreak of war across the strait, characterizing 
the nature of the relationship between the two states as peaceful would be misplaced. 
Economic integration between Taiwan and China has steadily increased since the 
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opening of economic relations, and the Taiwanese often cite economic growth as 
justification for reducing independence efforts, but this has not stymied the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement. So, while economic integration might restrain both states, and 
these theories might credit increasing economic relations for evading war, the absence 
of warfare does not equate to peace between the Taiwan Strait. The democratic peace 
does not account for security dilemmas, where economic necessity might prevent an 
outbreak of war, but does not diminish the fear associated with political uncertainty. 
This theory is reductionist in its views of interstate relationships, and like dependency 
theory, fails to account for the preference of other national priorities, such as securing 
a unified national identity.  
Taiwan’s efforts to reduce integration indicate that contrary to liberal theories, 
while economic integration might expand the planes upon which decision-making 
occurs, it does not mean that financial security consistently maintains the most 
prominent determinant of inter-state relationships. Despite the prominence of this 
theory, it rests on the assumption that democratic states act blindly according to 
financial selfishness.  
Foreign Direct Investment  
 
As globalization allows multinational corporations (MNCs) to increasingly 
operate across national borders and leverage the advantages of differing markets, 
foreign direct investment is becoming a significant form of capital flow. Between 
1995 and 2000, Global FDI flows increased by 700% and accounted for more flows 
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than all other forms of capital combined in many subsequent years.41 In addition, more 
research has examined the role of FDI as a form of development aid and its ability to 
promote domestic innovation in host countries. The international nature of MNCs and 
FDI allow them to operate outside of typical state governance, providing them with 
significant power and influence in the global economy.42 Taiwanese business owners 
of MNCs have played a significant role in the modern cross-strait relationship, thus 
considering the role of FDI in the future of the Taiwan-China relationship is essential. 
Historically, foreign direct investment has been viewed as a way for states and 
corporations to leverage cheaper markets in smaller, or less developed states. “Head” 
nations developed ideas and promoted them, while ‘body’ nations were merely 
involved in production.43 Similar to the principles of core and peripheral states, FDI 
flows allow smaller, less developed nations to play a more significant role in the 
global economy, because their cheaper labor markets and natural resources offer 
financial incentive to MNCs.44  However, as globalization incorporates more 
components of production into the global economy, investment interactions between 
states and MNCs have become more nuanced.  
 Since the mid-1990s, MNCs have become increasingly fractionalized, where 
different components of production are divided across multiple countries in order to 
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best leverage market conditions and tax incentives. Vertical specialization has allowed 
MNCs to increase profit margins while increasing the amount of nations utilizing 
FDI.45 This has created a more competitive environment for nations aiming to attract 
FDI for its perceived economic benefits and has transformed the way MNCs use FDI. 
FDI is no longer solely about resource and labor exploitation, but also finding nations 
with favorable investment climates and institutions that protect property rights.46 In 
this way, globalization has provided MNCs increasingly more leverage in the 
international economy.  
Foreign direct investment is different than typical capital flows, because FDI 
indicates a more long-term relationship between host country and investing country. 
During economic downturns, FDI is less impacted than traditional capital flows.47 48 
Additionally, FDI is often seen as a form of aid, because it increases economic 
productivity within the receiving country. Generally, economists have demonstrated 
that FDI within a country is associated with improved human development, but not 
causally. It can create spillover effects by stimulating internal markets.49 For example, 
FDI between 1995 and 2005 into China was responsible for increased domestic patent 
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applications in provinces where the investments were located.50 Because of the 
perceived benefits of FDI inflows, there has been a dramatic increase in bilateral 
investment treaties, providing MNCs with contractual agreements to protect investor 
rights.51 All of these improvements cater towards MNCs and lower production costs 
globally, but there is little research indicating if the increasingly competitive FDI 
environment is potentially harmful to developing countries and their labor forces, or 
how FDI outflows affect the economy of the sending country.  
Protectionism  
 
While it has not been determined that FDI alone can increase economic growth 
in a host country, foreign direct investment is typically viewed as valuable in a free 
trade environment. There is a prevalent agreement that the liberalization of FDI 
policies is “especially important for its potential to transfer knowledge and 
technology, create jobs, boost overall productivity, enhance competitiveness and 
entrepreneurship, and ultimately eradicate poverty through economic growth and 
development.”52 However, despite this general consensus, it is surprising then that 
protectionist FDI policies, particularly from nations hosting FDI, have grown 
significantly since 1992. Between 1992 and 1997, the emergence of new domestic 
protectionist FDI policies grew from 6% to 21% across the globe, and these new 
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policies were enacted by states that comprised 40% of global FDI.53 These 
protectionist policies threaten the global free trade environment, but they also signal 
the importance of domestic politics and attitudes in influencing economic decisions.  
What is the relationship between domestic politics and economic policies, and 
is there any significant impact from protectionism? Historically, protectionist trade 
policies have been shown to foster the growth of infant domestic industries,54 but these 
policies can also pose significant costs. For example, U.S. protectionist policies during 
1985 are estimated to have cost the U.S. $15-30 billion, and despite rhetoric to the 
contrary, other nations were not able to fully recover the cost of the tariffs by simply 
raising the price of their exports into the United States.55 In addition, Jakobsen found 
that nations with high nationalist sentiment were more likely to deter MNCs from 
investing in the state.56 While literature explores the ways nations encourage FDI 
through tax breaks and financial incentives, there is little exploring non-financial 
factors. As globalization increasingly necessitates economic interaction between 
states, and protectionist FDI policies become increasingly prevalent, it is becoming 
essential to understand how domestic politics and economic decision-making intersect, 
and to “delve further into the nonmaterial foundations of FDI support”57 
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Cross-Strait Political Economy 1987-1996 
  
Since the emergence of China’s Open Door Policy in 1978, China has made 
significant efforts to promote trade with Taiwan, mostly as a strategy to ensure greater 
control and integration across the strait.58 In 1979, China established a special 
economic zone in the Xiamen province, where government regulations were more 
free-market oriented in order to attract greater foreign investment.59 Xiamen’s location 
directly across the Taiwan Strait was strategic. Deng Xiaoping was aiming to 
incorporate Taiwan into the Chinese economic and political system in the same way 
that Hong Kong and Macau were, with regulated expanded freedoms and sovereignty 
resting in the Mainland. Deng aimed to use economic incentives to promote his “One 
Country, Two Systems” agenda. These strategies worked for attracting Taiwanese 
businesses. China’s cheap labor markets and proximity made it an attractive area for 
Taiwanese investments. “Mainland Fever” ran rampant across Taiwan, as investors 
leveraged the cheap labor forces in the mainland.60 However, the use of cheap labor 
markets did not represent the broader Taiwanese’ sentiments towards unification. As 
investors rushed to increase profit margins through Chinese markets, democratization 
was facilitating a powerful nationalist movement.  
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Democratization signaled a shift in Taiwan’s China Policy. Prior to 1988, the 
Taiwanese government had no formal structure for regulating investments in Mainland 
China, but Taipei’s official position regarding all components of the cross-strait 
relationship was “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise”. Taiwanese 
businesses still made significant investments into China, but did so illegally. In 1992, 
the KMT adopted a new China policy, allowing investments, but only via third party 
in another country, and with projects categorized into allow and prohibited 
categories.61 
The 1995 missile crisis signaled a sharp increase in regulations for Taiwanese 
investments across the strait.62 Prior to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, president Lee’s views 
on economic integration with the mainland were relatively liberal. Lee’s economic 
policy aimed to make Taipei a center for the “Greater Chinese Economy” by 
encouraging growth via trade with the mainland, as well as the rest of the global 
economy.63 However, his policies shifted significantly in 1996. Because of China’s 
hostile military actions after President Lee’s remarks at Cornell, Taiwanese leadership 
began to view economic integration as an issue of national security in addition to 
economic wellbeing. These two concerns dominated discussions of the role of 
economic relations with China for the future of the Taiwanese people as both an 
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ethnically and legally separate state from Mainland China and as a nation that 
prioritized economic development.  
In 1996, Lee began to discuss new economic policies with his inner-circle and 
preparing a new proposal for sharp restrictions and increased monitoring of economic 
investments across the strait. However, political divisions had begun to develop within 
the legislature, with the formation of the new Nationalist Party (NP), which evolved 
out of a split in Lee’s KMT party.  In order to appeal to the broadest political base, 
Lee scheduled the National Development conference to address prominent issues 
within Taiwanese democracy and international relations.  
  
“Taiwan First”- The National Development Conference  
 
 The National Development Conference convened on December 23, 1996 with 
the goals of creating constitutional reforms aimed at addressing salient issues within 
Taiwan. The purpose of the conference was to create consensus on compromises on 
these significant issues and bring them to the legislature to be ratified.  These issues 
were divided into 3 major categories, politics and political parties, economic 
development, and cross-strait relations.64 President Lee and his advisors had put 
significant work into developing the conference, with months of preparation preparing 
handbooks covering the topics discussed at the conference that included information 
regarding common areas of consensus and disagreements between political leaders, as 
well as potential compromises. 
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 Lee’s KMT party lacked the majority needed to pass constitutional 
amendments regarding cross-strait policy, thus any decisions regarding economic 
actions towards China required the input and consent of DPP and the newly formed 
NP party leaders. Lee had a vested interest in reaching consensus among members of 
the conference, with hopes that the consensus would translate into ratification within 
the legislature, and that his efforts towards compromise would bode well for him in 
the next presidential election. This is significant, because any NDC agreement 
signified the cooperation of 3 political parties with competing interests. More 
importantly, the NDC also included members of the public, from other branches of the 
government, academia and private businesses. Some of these participants were from 
outside Taiwan, including Americans and Hong Kong residents. None of the non-party 
leader participants could not vote on ratification, but their input was significant for 
decision-making.   
A comprehensive restrictive China policy found support across the entire 
political spectrum, despite the fact that investments into China accounted for the 
largest percentage of Taiwanese outward FDI.65 In addition to China’s missile strikes 
1 year prior, the Taiwanese were also concerned with Hong Kong’s scheduled return 
to China in the upcoming year. Hong Kong’s transition into a semi-sovereign territory 
of China was an outcome Taiwanese political leaders feared for their own country. 
Lee’s economic restrictions, which intensified monitoring of investments into China 
and banned numerous types of investments, represented broader fears of sacrificing 
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Taiwan’s sovereignty due to economic dependence on China.66 Because of these 
concerns, which generally transcended all political affiliations, “there was not a hint of 
opposition to Lee Teng-Hui’s No Haste policy”.67 The No Haste Policies found 
support across a multitude of competing interest groups.  
 This was not the case for all of Lee’s proposed policies. There was sharp 
disagreement over the constitutional reform sections of the conference. Notably, The 
NP sharply disagreed to Lee’s proposal of providing the president with the power to 
dismiss the legislature and even walked out of early discussions. Lee’s efforts on these 
fronts were seen as an attempt to consolidate his own power. Similarly, the DPP set up 
press conferences in which leaders vocalized their opposition to Lee and the KMT 
party and threatened to abandon the conference in total.68 In this light, agreement on 
Lee’s economic reform policies should not be seen as a more general agreement 
among policymakers on all key reforms discussed at the NDC. Instead, economic 
restrictions were heralded by all parties because they encompassed a broader 
grievance against the Chinese—denial of a unique Taiwanese identity.  
No Haste Policies 
  
 The No Haste policies were part of the broader “Taiwan First” initiative that 
began at the NDC. As part of these agreements, Lee established the Mainland Affairs 
Council (MAC) to monitor cross-strait relations and to develop policies regarding 
Taiwan-China interactions. The council still exists today, and operates outside the 
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interests of the president, although it is subject to his or her influence.69 The council’s 
ultimate goals are to balance national security and peace interests.  
 In 1997 the MAC persuaded the Ministry of Economic Affairs to establish 
economic policies further restricting foreign investment into China. Previously, certain 
types of investments were subject to approval, but new guidelines increased the 
number of types of investments totally prohibited. Notably, infrastructure investments 
were moved to the prohibited category because they were seen as benefitting China’s 
economic development, which would increase China’s political and economic control 
over Taiwan. In addition, the upper limit for investments was lowered, so that only 20-
40 percent of a company’s net worth could be invested in China, with large companies 
facing the lower-bound limit.70 On July 1, 1997, the same day that Hong Kong was 
scheduled to be returned to China, the No Haste policies took effect.  
 The broader Taiwanese public widely supported the NDC’s decision to 
increase regulation of economic relations across the strait. A Ministry of Economic 
Affairs poll in May 1997 found that 94% of Taiwanese agreed that “national security 
should be the first priority in initiating economic policies toward Mainland China”.71 
But, while government officials and the broader public generally agreed with Lee’s 
leadership in adopting the No Haste policies, the NDC decision to sharply increase 
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regulations found greater opposition in those who were most directly impacted by 
these investment restrictions—large business owners.72  
The business community’s sharp divergence from typical Taiwanese 
sentiments on the No Haste Policies is not surprising, considering that their 
livelihoods were most directly affected by the policies. In addition, the nature of FDI 
means that most Taiwanese might not perceive themselves as directly impacted by the 
restrictions, at least in the short run, because FDI is often viewed as an outflow of 
capital, rather than a direct investment in the Taiwanese people and the island’s 
economy.73 In addition, the Taiwanese public viewed China’s attempts to court 
Taiwanese MNCs with tax incentives and a competitive labor market as attempts to 
undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, thus any large investments signaled the successful 
manipulation of Taiwan’s businesses.74  While these conceptions of FDI are not 
entirely accurate, these attitudes were a significant contributor to the divergence of 
opinions between Taiwanese MNCs and the broader public.  
Case Study: Formosa Plastics Group  
 
Rhetoric from Taiwanese MNC leaders indicate that these newfound 
restrictions were extremely harmful to their company’s financial wellbeing. The 
government, and Lee specifically, began to experience significant backlash from these 
MNC leaders, because of the stringent policies reduced their ability to increase 
company profits in the mainland. Many of these MNC leaders held significant 
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influence over policy and politics because of their economic influence within the 
nation, and their uproar was proportionately influential. Notably, Y.C Wang, CEO of 
Formosa Plastics Group (FPG), made very public attempts to discredit Lee’s policies 
and led efforts to prevent his reelection.  
Wang’s Formosa Plastic Group began producing PVC in 1954, and eventually 
grew to become the largest employer in Taiwan.75 Wang helped diversify FPG into the 
petrochemical industry and increased the company’s overseas investments 
significantly, mainly in the United States and China.76  
In 1996, Wang submitted an investment application for a $3.8 billion power 
plant in Zhangzhou, China.77 The Chinese government had been aggressively 
encouraging the project because of its perceived economic benefits for the mainland. 
FPG was granted significant tax breaks, and the Chinese government had announced a 
massive infrastructure project within Zhangzhou in order to streamline the 
construction process of the power plant.78 If approved, the project would become the 
largest Taiwanese investment in China—22 times larger than the second greatest 
Taiwanese investment program.79 Initially, the MOEA provided approval for Wang’s 
application, but as Lee began to publicly advocate for investment restrictions across 
the strait in 1996, which eventually developed at the NDC later that year, the decision 
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was reversed, and Wang removed his application due to pressure from the MOEA.80 In 
addition to contestation about the massive size of FPG’s investment, Wang’s power 
plant was largely banned because it was outside of FPG’s usual scope of 
investments—petrochemical and plastics manufacturing. Instead, the investment was 
seen as directly benefitting the Chinese via power generation and was not perceived by 
Lee or the MOEA to have direct benefits to the economic growth of Taiwan.81  
While Wang had met privately with members of the MOEA and they had 
agreed on the removal of his application, in March 1997 he announced to his 
employees that construction would proceed anyways. Wang had simply bypassed the 
government in funding the power plant by having one of his international subsidiaries 
fund a majority of the project.82 While the initial funding of the project could be 
funded via outside subsidiaries, future stages of the project would require significantly 
more capital and would necessitate FPG’s direct financial support, thus Wang made 
his public announcement in hopes that the government would shift towards more 
liberalized policies. This public plea for policy change failed. Wang’s FPG was fined 
NT $15 Million (approximately $US 506,000) and was forced into compliance.   
Wang’s efforts were supported by the business community, because they 
represented an alternative approach to guarding Taiwan from dependence on Chinese 
markets. A March 30th, 1997 China Times editorial reflected their sentiments that 
“instead of penalizing Formosa Plastics and [Y.C. Wang] and other industrial 
companies, why not speed up the development of Taiwan into a more competitive 
                                                
80 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, 83. 
81 Deng, "Taiwan's Restriction of Investment.” 970. 
82 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, 83-84. 
 33 
entity?”83 However, despite their assertions that improving Taiwan’s investment 
climate was essential for developing economic independence from China and to 
improve the quality of life for citizens of their homeland, Wang’s power plant project 
demonstrated that it was not his goal to broadly increase the prosperity of the 
Taiwanese people, but to significantly drive profits for his company alone. His power 
plant did not streamline manufacturing efficiencies or lower production costs for 
goods, but provided energy to the Chinese people.  
No Haste-Implications 
 
 With the implementation of the No Haste policies in July 1997, Taiwanese 
companies were forced to comply with the new regulations and restrictions. Initially, 
business owners with significant political power and influence resisted, but Lee was 
unrelenting in his enforcement of the policies. As a result of Taiwan’s decision to 
prioritize national security and sovereignty and to sacrifice economic wellbeing, 
Taiwan saw a sharp decrease in contracted FDI into China, as well as a steep decrease 
in total outward FDI, as demonstrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Foreign Direct Investment, Taiwan to China 1993-2004 
 
Source: Data from Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of Taiwan, “Cross Strait 
Economic Statistics Monthly.”  
 
The chart above indicates the change in Taiwan’s outward FDI into China 
during this time period. There is a sharp increase, followed by a sharp decrease 
between 1997 and 1998. The sharp increase is because the Taiwanese government 
instituted a large crackdown on unregistered investments upon implementation of the 
No Haste policies. Investors that previously invested illegally were forced to submit 
proposals under the new laws, creating a larger than usual influx of investment 
requests.84 Thus, this drastic increase does not indicate an actual increase in new 
investments across the strait, but simply a retroactive recognition of older investments. 
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This sharp decline in FDI into the PRC in 1998 is accompanied by a slightly less sharp 
reduction in total FDI, which might initially indicate a general contraction of FDI due 
to market conditions, but most likely signifies that Taiwanese business owners were 
not able to initially redirect their prohibited Chinese investments to another country, 
thus, an initial contraction in total FDI is not surprising, as Taiwanese investors 
struggled to find another nation appropriate for their investment projects.  
 A decline in both FDI into the PRC and total FDI continues until 1999. At this 
point, both total FDI and FDI into the PRC increase, but with total FDI increasing by 
$3.16 billion, and FDI into the PRC increasing by $1.36 billion. Despite increases for 
both forms of investments, the gap between total FDI and FDI into the PRC is largest 
at this point.85  
The table below indicates the amount of new cases for Taiwanese investments 
into PRC approved by the MOEA between 1992 and 2001, as well as contracted FDI 
into China between 1992 and 2001. Contracted FDI is different from FDI flows 
because it represents a new project commitment, which is supposed to materialize over 
time, rather than an actualized investment for the year. While the amount of approved 
cases in 1997 and 1998 increased drastically, from previous years, the contracted 
amount of FDI did not. In fact, the contracted amount of FDI in 1997 is almost half of 
the previous year, although there are more than 22 times the amount of MOEA 
approved cases than 1996.  The contracted FDI exhibits a similar pattern to the overall 
FDI, with drastic reductions occurring after the implementation of Lee’s regulations, 
despite the fact that the new regulations cracked down on illegal investments and 
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resulted in a massive influx of investment applications. FDI remains below 1996 
levels until 2001, when Chen Shui-Bian’s liberalization policies took effect.   
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Figure 2 Investments in Mainland China, 1992-2001 
 
 Approved 
investment cases 
by MOEA 
Contracted amount 
in $US million 
1992 264 $5,543.35 
1993 9,329 $9,964.87 
1994 934 $5,394.88 
1995 490 $5,849.07 
1996 383 $5,141.00 
1997 8,725 $2,814.49 
1998 1,284 $2,981.68 
1999 488 $3,374.44 
2000 840 $4,041.89 
2001 1,186 $6,914.19 
Source: Data from Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of Taiwan, “Cross-Strait 
Economic Statistics Monthly.” no. 169, table 10. 
http://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/MMO/MAC/兩岸經濟統計月報
no.16910.pdf.  
 
 
An Alternative Investment Route: “Go South”  
 
In order to offset the decline in investments into China, Lee encouraged 
Taiwanese MNCs to “go south”. His ambition for this initiative was to both diversify 
the Taiwanese economy and recuperate any economic contractions due to No Haste 
regulations. His Go South initiative encouraged investors to send their FDI towards 
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Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam.86 
However, lack of proper infrastructure and security concerns often limited investment 
capabilities in Southeast Asia.87 In addition, All ASEAN nations had developed 
diplomatic relations with PRC rather than Taiwan, making it more difficult to develop 
trade agreements or facilitate discussions about investment climates.88 
 Investment in ASEAN countries had historically been in capital intensive 
projects such as textiles and electronics assembling, whereas China was known for its 
engineering and technology capacity, as well as inexpensive labor.89  Large 
companies, such as Tundex Group and Pao Cheng Shoe Co. tended to expand their 
investments into both China and Southeast Asian countries while maintaining 
headquarters in Taiwan. These companies leveraged their relative advantages in each 
country in order to create efficiencies in their production processes.90  
 By discouraging investment in Chinese markets, Lee’s Go South initiative 
disproportionately harmed mid-sized private firms. Larger firms were able to more 
easily recuperate costs associated with moving FDI to ASEAN countries, and could 
manage wage increases and inflation more so than smaller firms.91 The combination of 
No Haste and Go South removed economic efficiencies created when MNCs could 
take advantage of the relative advantages of Chinese and ASEAN markets. By largely 
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prohibiting major investments in China, No Haste forced MNCs to use less effective 
markets for FDI and disrupted opportunities for FDI fragmentation that would enable 
MNCs to use both Chinese and ASEAN markets for their respective market strengths. 
Lee’s policies failed to account for the possibility of increasing investment diversity 
without largely impeding investment efforts in Taiwan’s largest investment partner.  
2001- Chen Shui-bian and Liberalization 
 
 In March 2000, Chen Shui-bian was elected president of Taiwan. Chen, a DPP 
member, was the first to break the 40-year reign of the KMT party, and the peaceful 
transition signaled an important milestone for Taiwan’s democracy. Chen advocated a 
different form of interaction with China than his predecessor, while still holding fully 
to the idea that “Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China are two countries that do 
not belong to each other, do not rule each other, and do not administer each other.”92 
Chen had only won a plurality of votes in the 2000 election and faced a legislature 
dominated by KMT party members. His strategy in gaining the presidency was to 
appeal to the widest base of voters by avoiding extremism, despite the fact that many 
of his DPP party members were strongly against any policies that might indicate future 
unification with China.  
 Chen did not differ from Lee on his stance of Taiwan’s sovereignty, nor on his 
opinion of the threat of China imposing on Taiwan’s national security, but approached 
economic integration with the mainland differently.93 His presidency signaled a shift 
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in economic policy toward China, while still maintaining a strong insistence of 
Taiwan’s status as a separate state from PRC.  
 In 2001, Chen hosted the Economic Development Advisory Conference 
(EDAC), which was similar in nature to Lee’s NDC. The conference included 
representatives from the government, academia, and business owners. EDAC 
members reached agreement on reframing Taiwan’s investment policies in order to 
liberalize economic relations between the states. The categories of investments were 
reduced to include only ‘prohibited’ and ‘general’ investments. There was no longer a 
review process for smaller investments, as long as the project was reported to the 
MOEA.94 In addition, the EDAC signaled the beginning of discussions for direct trade 
and postal routes to the Chinese mainland, rather than a third-party territory, such as 
Hong Kong or Macao.95  
 In his closing statement at the EDAC, Chen said, “Twenty-first century Taiwan 
must find a stable and balanced economic ‘third way’ between economic development 
and environmental protection, between industrial investment and welfare of the 
disadvantaged, and between corporate and labor interests, and it has to be carried out 
with the cooperation of the government and the private sector.”96 Notably missing 
from his rhetoric is reference to national security or identity formation. Chen’s 
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approach to economic relations was starkly different from Lee’s. A Chen Shui-Bian 
presidency signaled the possibility preserving national identity while simultaneously 
encouraging economic liberalization. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 National security dominated Taiwan’s economic policies towards PRC 
between 1996 and 2001. These policies were a direct result of The Taiwan Strait 
Crisis, and fears of the Chinese leveraging Taiwan’s economic dependence to deny 
Taiwan its autonomy. Specifically, the No Haste Policies addressed investments into 
mainland China and drastically reduced the amount of approved investments across 
the strait. These policies addressed FDI because of its tendency to largely benefit the 
hosting country (PRC) rather than the Taiwanese economy. These policies were 
widely supported as efforts to reinforce a unique Taiwanese identity, but found 
opposition from Taiwan’s business community. President Lee’s efforts to counteract 
the contraction in FDI resulting from his No Haste policies failed to consider the 
different market conditions of other investment nations, thus created economic 
inefficiencies. Despite these significant economic disadvantages brought on by 
extensive regulation across the strait, the Taiwanese people broadly supported the No 
Haste Policies as efforts to reduce dependence on China and establish a firmly 
separate Taiwanese national identity. Chen Shui-bian’s election into the presidency in 
2000 signaled a shift in economic policy towards China, but not a reformation of 
Taiwanese identity. The next chapter will explore identity formation over time, and 
how the Taiwanese people conceptualized their national identity in relation to China 
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over time, allowing a shift in policy that did not violate core tenets of their national 
identity narrative.  
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Chapter 2: National Identity 
 
In order to understand the sources of Taiwan’s economic protectionism 
between 1996 and 2001, it is important to examine Taiwanese national identity—both 
its sources and implications in policymaking. My argument is that the No Haste 
policies were primarily a function of national identity rather than rational economic 
decision-making. To further this hypothesis, this chapter will explore nationhood and 
nationalism and how it is conceptualized and made operational within states.  Then, I 
will explain how Taiwan’s strict economic regulations following the Taiwan Strait 
Crisis were a function of national identity formation. Finally, I will seek to provide 
justification for the significant policy shift towards liberalization following Chen Shui-
Bian’s election in light of shifting identity.  
Nation and Nationalism Defined 
 
A nation, as defined by Benedict Anderson, is an imagined community, both 
politically sovereign and limited in its scope.97 Nations are not inherent, but subject to 
a collective consciousness whereby membership is bestowed and withheld based on 
intersubjective criteria determined by those already maintaining membership. A nation 
necessitates boundaries and exclusion of outsiders, but the malleable nature of identity 
makes boundaries susceptible to modification over time.98 Nationality is defined by a 
shared characteristic among members, including ethnicity, language, religion, or 
shared values or history.99 The nation, as conceived by its members, demands a level 
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of kinship and loyalty to other members of the nation, even without understanding the 
personal characteristics of an individual. In this way, nationality acts a heuristic for 
trust and faith.  “In the minds of each lives the image of their communion”100 
While often used interchangeably, the nation and a state are not always 
mutually constitutive. A state’s existence is dependent upon mutual recognition by 
other states and explicit physical boundaries. Few states are composed of a singular 
nation, making the state a function of nationality, but others are composed of differing 
groups that do not conceive of their state and nation as a unified component of their 
identities. The ‘nation’ appeals to a more fundamental component of an individual’s 
identity, demanding loyalty and comradery with those sharing nationality. This is 
because nationality is imagined to be based in antiquity and carries a profound level of 
sacredness.101 Contrarily, a state’s existence and legitimacy is bounded solely in the 
present. State boundaries, landscapes, and monuments might carry profound 
significance within a state, but this is rooted in their symbolism tied to national 
identity. These physical components of states find significance in their socially 
attributed narratives.102 So, while the nation and state are not mutually exclusive, 
collective cultural significance is most prominent when societies conceive of 
themselves as a nation. In this way, analysis of state actions, particularly in democratic 
societies, benefits from an understanding that decision making can reflect national 
identity, constructed by citizens as part of the collective self.  
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Nationalism is the allegiance to one’s nation above all other identity 
categories. In rendering decisions, the interests of one’s nation are primary. 
Nationalism differs from patriotism, in that patriotism involves positive attachment to 
a national group, whereas nationalism necessitates derogatory feelings towards 
outgroups.103 When national identity is consistently the most salient identity, an 
individual can easily conceive of their personal and national identity as mutually 
constitutive. For marginalized groups, oppression along ethnic lines can so define their 
interactions with others that group identity can become a cognitive heuristic for self-
identity. This has been documented in African Americans where voting behaviors 
have historically been consistent throughout all socioeconomic and class levels.104 The 
black utility heuristic is a function of African Americans having faced historical 
systematic subjugation along economic and racial lines. Oppression provides almost 
all African Americans with a mutual understanding that what is best for the group is 
also best for individuals within the group.105   Similarly, creole nationalism, or 
postcolonial nationalism, is a subset of nationalist movements, and is the result of 
colonialism and imperial conquest. Societies that have been subject to colonialism are 
provided with a salient national identity that is reinforced through social and political 
activities where ethnicity is presented as the most dominant determinate of 
interactions.106 According to Yinan He, “What frequently reinforces creole patriotism 
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is a bitter sense of dispossession and alienation from the discriminatory and even 
oppressive system imposed by the metropole on the colonies.”107  
Nation and Memory  
 
 Collective memory is critical to sustaining a national identity because through 
these memories, societies imagine their shared experiences and traditions.108 
According to Homi Bhabha, “nations, like narratives, lose their origins in the myths of 
time and only fully realize their horizon’s in the mind’s eye.”109 Shared experiences 
reinforce the cultural boundaries that define the nation. They also inform a nation’s 
present identity and facilitate future hopes, expectations, and goals. Critical to the 
construction of ethnic identity is ethno-history, which is the embodiment of a society’s 
collective memory and understanding of culturally significant historical events. Ethno-
history “is multi-stranded and contested; it is always subject to change; and it is 
globally uneven.”110 In addition, it is entirely subject to a society’s opinions, 
prejudices, and interpretation of events; thus, it remains flexible and ever-changing, 
much like identity itself. Nations often construct their identities by claiming their 
legitimacy stems from pre-existing categories and communities, thus memory 
becomes critical in defining national identity.  However, ethno-history is not limited to 
historically factual events, thus, myths, folktales, or embellished historical events can 
function as formative identity narratives. Communities can develop a cohesive 
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national identity through the mutual understanding of a historical event, whether or not 
that that interpretation reflects objective history.  
Nation and Narrative  
 
For post-colonial states, the act of colonization can often form the necessary 
cultural understanding of an independent national identity by creating divisions 
between colonizer and colonized along cultural or ethnic lines. In this way, 
colonization forces the perpetual salience of cultural identity in the form of 
oppression. Bhaba astutely puts it that “the nation fills the void left in the uprooting of 
communities and kin, and turns the loss into the language of metaphor.”111  Memories 
of their former colonizer can affect the nature of the relationship, even after significant 
time has passed. While memory plays a role in the conception of all nations, it is 
certainly heightened in post-colonial states, where atrocity and exploitation are often 
rooted within the social construction of nationhood. W.E.B Dubois asserted that 
historically exploited and subjugated cultures held a “double consciousness” whereby 
memories of past subjugation informed political behaviors in the present.112 Similarly, 
Kelly found that Australia’s modern-day ambivalence towards the British was a 
function of interactions during World War I.113  
Post-colonial trauma often manifests itself in popular culture, including 
literature, art, and other modes of expression.114 It also can emerge in political 
narratives and policy formation. Campbell argues that foreign policies are extensions 
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of national identities and that viewing national security through the lens of identity 
formation is critical for accounting for policy decisions.115 Similarly, Goddard and 
Krebs posit that a legitimation process is critical for framing national security interests 
and creating grand strategy in the face of national insecurity.116 As a socially 
constructed concept, national interest benefits from a compelling narrative that unifies 
a nation and provides justification for policies. For example, by reframing the context 
of World War I through his Fireside Chat narratives, FDR was able to shift public 
opinion towards favoring involvement in the conflict.117   
National Identity and Ontological Security 
 
Anderson asserts that the conception of the nation appeals to a fundamental 
component of collective identity, so much so that it transcends economic and political 
needs or ambitions. In his words, “If people imagined the proletariat merely as a group 
in hot pursuit of refrigerators, holidays, or power, how far would they, including 
members of the proletariat, be willing to die for it?”118 His illustration demonstrates 
how the nation appeals to a fundamental component of self-hood. As an extension of 
his analysis, ontological security is critical to the concept of nationhood. Ontological 
security is the security of the self, whether individual or collective. While realist and 
liberal economic theorists assert that capital and ambition underlie state actions, 
ontological security posits that security of the self can play significant roles in 
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determining relationships between groups.119 In preserving ontological security, 
relationships that are harmful can become routinized functions of interaction, “which 
means states can become attached to conflict.”120 In this view, tension between nations 
is not a function of uncertainty, as security dilemmas are often framed, but the result 
of intentional efforts to maintain a consistent relationship, despite the possibility of 
negative implications.121 The concept of ontological security stresses the value that 
individuals and groups place on establishing agency. When ontological security is 
sacrificed for physical security, nations can experience significant shame, because this 
represents a betrayal of self-hood.122 To reconcile this dissonance between physical 
and ontological security, states will sacrifice physical security. Ontological security 
becomes a valuable lens for examining foreign policy because of its ability to 
contradict traditional understandings of how national security is constructed. More 
specifically, in understanding Taiwan’s relationship to China, it lends to a more 
nuanced narrative as to why the Taiwanese willingly prioritized state autonomy over 
economic security. 
The rest of this chapter will shift to explore Taiwan’s experience in light of 
nationalist literature. Taiwan’s history and experiences offer the nation a strong sense 
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of national identity that has been created through a colonial past and is continually 
leveraged in modern political and cultural policies. 
Taiwan’s Nationalist Movement—Why China?  
 
While Taiwan’s history has been dominated by various colonial powers, 
including the Dutch, Spanish, Japanese, and KMT Chinese Nationalists, modern 
nationalist grievances are most deeply rooted in KMT rule between 1945 and 1987. 
Why? The Japanese and Chinese are often referred to as Taiwan’s “unforgettable 
others” because their modes of governance have been significantly more involved than 
prior powers that simply leveraged Taiwan’s geographical location for trading ports. 
However, attitudes towards the Chinese have historically been heavily negative in 
relation to attitudes towards Japan.123 Japanese colonial rule was often equally 
repressive and involved as KMT nationalist rule, but the common modern narrative of 
Japanese leadership is significantly more respectful than the narrative surrounding 
KMT leadership. I assert that the discontinuity in narratives stems from the differing 
governance models adapted by the Japanese and KMT.  
Taiwan was conceded to Japan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War, and 
the Japanese quickly incorporated the island into Japan’s growing economic model. 
Investment from Japan into Taiwan was encouraged by Japanese leadership. A 
national railway was developed, as well as social programs and compulsory 
schooling.124 Weights and measurements were standardized, and property rights were 
developed. All of these modernization efforts were aimed at using Taiwan as an 
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agricultural appendage of Japan.125 While Japanese leadership brought economic 
growth, the Taiwanese maintained their autonomous cultural identity because it did 
not impede on Japan’s imperial model. Economic development was the main axis of 
interaction between the Taiwanese and Japanese. During World War II, many 
Taiwanese were called to serve alongside the Japanese in defending their rule in the 
Asia-Pacific. Upon Japan’s loss to the Allied Powers, Taiwan was conceded as a war 
reparation to the Chinese and colonial Japanese leadership ended. In the aftermath of 
the War, Japanese families of deceased soldiers received compensation from the 
Japanese government. However, Taiwan’s concession to China meant the Taiwanese 
were denied reparations for their losses. Similarly, monuments in Japan honoring the 
deceased are notably missing their Taiwanese compatriots.126 In these ways, the 
Japanese systematically denied the Taiwanese access to the protections and equality 
granted under Japanese leadership and maintained a system of repression against the 
Taiwanese. Taiwanese soldiers were “not to live as Japanese, but to die as Japanese”. 
127  However, no matter the degree of neglect or denial of human rights, in their 
suffering, the Taiwanese maintained a level of autonomy and unique collective 
identity.128 Their experiences were separate from their imperial power, providing fuel 
for a common Taiwanese national narrative.  
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KMT rule was fundamentally different in its treatment of Taiwanese identity. 
Chiang Kai-Shek and his nationalist army was outcast to Taiwan after a bitter civil 
war between Mao’s communist party and Chiang’s nationalists. However, Chiang 
Kai-Shek remained insistent that his leadership encompassed China as a whole, 
including the mainland. Incorporating the Taiwanese into his narrative of Chinese 
nationalism became the party’s imperative. Despite almost 400 years of various 
colonial experiences, the Taiwanese had maintained autonomous concepts of their 
island prior to KMT rule. Leadership based on economic exploitation had allowed the 
Taiwanese to maintain their cultural narrative, but Chiang’s regime began 
systematically indoctrinating the Taiwanese with Chinese nationalist propaganda. 
Aboriginal languages were forbidden, and Mandarin adopted as the standard language 
across the island. Many industries were nationalized, and private property seized from 
peasants. The KMT introduced school curriculum that centered around Chinese 
nationalism, and passing the civil service exam required memorizing large 
components of KMT ideology.129  
The differing perspectives of the Taiwanese towards the Chinese Nationalists 
and Japanese can best be explained by the way each colonizer respected Taiwanese 
identity. While the Japanese denied the Taiwanese full access into the benefits of 
Japanese economic growth, exploited the resources of the island for imperial 
imperatives, and refused the Taiwanese full benefits of Japanese citizenry, their 
actions still represented the conception of the Taiwanese as a separate culture and 
nation. Although Japanese imperial rule repeatedly reminded the Taiwanese people 
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that their heritage was inferior, the distinction between ‘Japanese’ and ‘Taiwanese’ 
remained clearly separate and consistent. Complaints against the Japanese can be 
rooted in injustice and inequality, but not of denial of identity. The narrative of the 
KMT was fundamentally different. In the eyes of the KMT, the Taiwanese were part 
of the broader Chinese culture, and the oppression experienced by the Taiwanese was 
for the purpose of denying them self-determination. In this way, The Taiwanese 
nationalist movement is not a function of human rights grievances, but the denial of a 
fundamental component of personhood—the right to a self-determined identity.  
A similarity can be drawn between the KMT’s method of colonialism and 
China’s modern attempts to restrain the Taiwanese in any efforts to assert an 
autonomous identity. The Chinese government continues to insist that Taiwan’s 
sovereignty rests in China, which is most clearly seen through the “One Country, Two 
Systems” narrative that has prevailed since Taiwan’s democratization. The Chinese 
aren’t simply pushing the Taiwanese into diplomatic isolation or merely subjecting 
Taiwan’s economy to economic dependence on the mainland, but like the KMT, The 
Chinese government continuously leverages its economic prowess and global political 
power in order to quell alternative national identity narratives.  
In addition, the fact that the KMT suppressed the Taiwanese for decades under 
a purely Sino-centric narrative is key to understanding how these separate government 
regimes afflicted the Taiwanese along the same axis, and why memories of past 
generational horrors influenced the actions of the Taiwanese after democratization.  
Remembering Atrocity- 2/28 
 
 54 
The February 28th Incident (2/28), is the most commonly referred to moment in 
Taiwanese history. The chain of events that occurred in February 1947 function as a 
platform for the modern Taiwanese nationalist movement, and Taiwanese identity 
more generally. According to Robert Edmonson, “This event is perhaps the most the 
most important single event in Taiwanese history because it made Taiwanese history 
thinkable.”130 2/28 offers the Taiwanese a clear definitional point where Taiwanese 
ethnicity first became salient in determining their role in society. While prior 
interactions with colonizers involved discrimination and inferior treatment, 2/28 and 
the KMT’s subsequent 3-decade martial law directly pointed to Taiwanese heritage 
and culture as the most defining characteristic involved in their subjugation. Because 
of this, 2/28 emerged as the platform upon which the Taiwanese nationalist movement 
formed. 
 On February 28, 1947, a female cigarette vendor was beaten by KMT police 
for selling cigarettes without a permit. This singular event was the culmination of 
tensions between the KMT and Taiwanese public, who had been subject to significant 
harsh reforms since Chiang Kai-Shek’s leadership began in 1945. In retaliation to 
broad government overreach, riots broke out around the country. The Taiwanese 
leveraged this event to form a collective opposition to the KMT and on March 7th 
presented the KMT with their “32 Demands”, which included the introduction of 
opposition parties, open elections, and the protection of civil liberties.131 The KMT 
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responded mercilessly. What ensued is referred to as The White Terror, whereby 
thousands of Taiwanese intellectuals and dissidents were systematically disappeared, 
and opposition to the KMT was brutally repressed. Su Bing, a Taiwanese witness of 
the terror that ensued, as well as a historian, wrote of that day— “Letting the 
policeman lead the way, they [the KMT] searched every home, arrested any person 
they found on the street. Cutting off ears and noses of the arrested, amputating arm 
and legs, or pushing their victims off roofs, the Chinese soldiers went through the 
catalogue of massacres. Some people, bound together with several other people by 
wires pierced through their palms and ankles, were tied in a row, and were thrown into 
the Keelung Harbor.”132 Martial Law was installed in the nation, and persisted until 
1987.   
 Upon democratization in 1987, the Taiwanese were free to discuss 2/28 for the 
first time. The trauma of the incident was so impressed upon the people of Taiwan, 
that many parents didn’t tell their children of the event until 1987.133 This is partly due 
to the culture of silence surrounding 2/28 that was enforced by the KMT, but also 
because Taiwanese culture, like many other East Asian cultures, values the concept of 
saving face. Traumatic events for nations that value the preservation of face, such as 
the Nanjing Massacre for the Chinese,  or the exploitation of Comfort Women in 
Korea, are often embedded in significant shame, even though the shamed communities 
were victims, rather than perpetrators of violence.134 The shame stems from failing to 
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protect their culture’s dignity, either by preventing the atrocity, or overcoming it.135 
Although the ability of the Taiwanese to overcome their suppressors was extremely 
limited, this view explains how their culture of voluntary silence, as well as 
governmentally enforced silence,  repressed 2/28 narratives, both formally and 
informally. Chiang Kai-Shek’s death and Taiwan’s subsequent democratization laid 
the groundwork for the Taiwanese to explore 2/28 and its meaning to their national 
identity.  
2/28 and National Identity 
 
 What emerged out of democratization was a deep resentment for both Chiang 
Kai-Shek and the Mainland Chinese government. The Taiwanese began a significant 
reform process that aimed to eliminate many of Chiang’s policies that represented 
“One China”. Resentment against the two regimes (KMT and PRC) was coupled 
together and emerged as a massive ‘de-sinicization’ campaign, where cultural and 
political artifacts representing Chinese nationalism or Chiang’s KMT rule were 
systematically dismantled. This de-sinicization process will be explored more in-depth 
in the following chapter, but my argument here is that these reforms were a function of 
an emerging national identity that, in addition to Chiang’s KMT party, placed China as 
the “Other”.136 In claiming to represent the Chinese people as a whole, Chiang Kai-
Shek’s 30-year autocracy embedded within the Taiwanese a deep sense of 
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nationalism, and central to this movement was 2/28. As Mainland China aimed to 
assert its control over Taiwan in the 1990s, the 2/28 narrative of atrocity that sparked 
the nationalist movement also fueled resentment and opposition against the PRC’s 
perceived government overreach.  
 According to Richard Werbner, “subjected to buried memory, people do not so 
much forget as much as recognize—and often ever more forcefully—that they have 
not been allowed to remember.”137 In what he calls unfinished history, efforts to 
remember events that have been repressed by governmental or cultural forces are often 
equally resentful of the denial of memory as they are mournful of the actual event. 
This is very much true for the Taiwanese.  
Chiang Ching-Kuo took up his father’s mantle of KMT autocracy upon his 
death in 1978. This signaled the unraveling of single party government in Taiwan, but 
also opened the door for opposition movements, both political and apolitical in nature. 
While heavily repressed and officially illegal until democratization, the Taiwanese 
nationalist movement emerged during this period as a direct extension of 2/28 
memorial efforts. Often, attempts to peacefully commemorate the atrocity and mourn 
the deceased were treated as riots by the KMT government. These movements became 
increasingly politicized as questions of Chiang Kai-Shek’s personal involvement in 
2/28 came into question. While previous government sanctioned narratives insisted 
Chiang’s role was limited, groups began to contest that he did not send troops during 
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2/28 in a peacekeeping effort, but actually sanctioned the slaughter of individuals in 
order to subdue opposition.138 In positioning Chiang Kai-Shek as a violent offender 
against the people he claimed to represent in all facets of identity, the Taiwanese 
people were threatening the entire premise upon which he governed. Similarly, by 
incorporating 2/28 into the ethnonationalist movement, the Taiwanese were chipping 
away at the legitimacy of the KMT, both presently and in the past.  
 As leaders in this movement became increasingly vocal and 2/28 events 
emerged as politicized events, an ethnic awakening began throughout Taiwan. The 
February 28th incident became the anchor point upon which the nationalist movement 
claimed its origin. As a reference point for grievances, 2/28 “historiciz[ed] current 
ethnic tensions and antigovernment sentiment.”139 The goals of the nationalist 
movement were two-fold, democratization and independent statehood. For the 
Taiwanese, “the movement of Formosan self-determination has not been conceived as 
a political party movement, but has grown out of universal protest against exploitation 
experienced by one and all since 1945.”140 
 During the same period, Taiwan’s legitimation as a separate state from 
Mainland China was steadily eroded. The nation was removed from its U.N. seat in 
1972, and international leaders began to recognize PRC as the true representation of 
the Chinese state. Even the Japanese, who had historically designated ROC and PRC 
as separate states, removed Taiwan’s diplomatic recognition. Nixon’s visit to the PRC 
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in 1978 solidified the mainland’s growing significance across the globe and Taiwan’s 
new role as a state without any diplomatic power.   
As a movement that centered around the conception of the Taiwanese people 
as a unique and autonomous nation from all former and future colonizers, The 
Taiwanese nationalist movement simultaneously otherized the autocratic KMT and the 
Chinese mainland. Separate in objectives, but similar in methods of control, these 2 
governments were viewed through the 2/28 lens—denial of identity and agency was 
responsible for the subjugation of the Taiwanese people. The nationalist movement 
was both domestic and international in nature, and attempts to undermine this 
movement were perceived as threats to nationhood. 
At its core, this movement was a retaliation against the denial of Taiwanese 
identity and government repression of national autonomy. The mainland Chinese, 
much like Chiang’s KMT, aimed to incorporate Taiwan into its existing Chinese 
framework, and their efforts to subdue Taiwanese identity appeared on 2 fronts—
diplomacy and economic dependency.  Through the eyes of the Taiwanese, PRC was 
simply aiming to make Taiwan another colonial exploit.  
While Taiwan’s lack of diplomatic recognition could not be easily overcome, 
economic dependence could more easily be controlled through internal policy 
initiatives. The next section will position the No Haste policies as a reflection of 
Taiwan’s ceaseless attempts to reaffirm their own identity as a politically sovereign 
and economically autonomous nation.  
No Haste and National Identity 
 
 60 
While it can be argued that the No Haste policies were simply an attempt to 
reduce dependence on Chinese markets to establish a more varied economic 
framework, President Lee’s rhetoric, as well as national identity surveys and 
newspaper coverage indicate that these policies were a function of nationalism. This 
section will explore the events that led to the emergence of these economic restrictions 
and situate them within a nationalist framework.  
The No Haste policies were a direct response to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, but 
more broadly, encompassed grievances against the Chinese for their perceived 
government overreach. Obviously, Deng Xiaoping’s Chinese leadership was not an 
extension of Chiang Kai-Shek’s prior governance, but Chiang’s indoctrination process 
ensured that the Taiwanese people viewed Chiang and the KMT as representative of 
the Chinese and their leadership. The KMT had presented the Taiwanese people with 
an ‘other’ that had allowed the Taiwanese to conceive of their separate ethnic identity, 
and that ‘other’ was China. This antagonistic relationship was solidified through the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, which occurred in response to a speech by President Lee in 1995. 
The chain of events that occurred thereafter, reinforced the Taiwanese conception of 
national identity.  
The Taiwan Strait Crisis was the direct result of Lee’s June 9, 1995 speech at 
Cornell titled “Always in My Heart”. Lee was the designated commencement speaker 
at his alumni reunion, and while he began his speech reminiscing on his experiences at 
Cornell, the majority of his speech focused on the “Taiwan Experience,” which 
highlighted his preference for Taiwanese independence. Within his 10-minute speech, 
Lee referenced Taiwan as its own separate nation 41 times and repeatedly emphasized 
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the incompatibility of democracy and communism--- an allusion to China.141 In 
addition, he highlighted the difficulty Taiwan faced in developing relationships with 
other nations in light of Taiwan’s dismissal from the U.N.  The most contentious 
moment of the speech occurred in his conclusion, where he famously said, “some say 
that it is impossible for us to break out of the diplomatic isolation we face, but we will 
do our utmost to demand the impossible.”142  
On July 24, 1995, a response to Lee’s speech was issued by China Daily, the 
official Communist Part of China (CPC) news outlet. In this response, the CPC 
chastised Lee because he “advocated splitting the motherland”. The CPC asserted that 
he was ‘peddling his ideas’, that he was ‘cast[ing] off his disguise’ and his rhetoric 
was a ‘perverse act of betraying national interest’.143  
Both Lee’s speech, and the CPC’s rebuke framed the disagreement between 
Taiwan and China as an issue of sovereignty and unification, not of economic 
imperative. So, while the subsequent economic restrictions did additionally serve to 
aim at reducing Taiwanese dependence on Chinese markets, rhetoric by both the 
Taiwanese and Chinese indicate that this disagreement was a national identity issue at 
its core, and that economics were simply an extension of identity construction.  
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To what extent did Lee conceive of these economic restrictions allowing the 
Taiwanese to gain international recognition as a separate state? From an international 
perspective, the likelihood of Taiwan gaining international diplomatic recognition or 
independence through these efforts was small. China’s position within the global 
economy and its insistence that states choose between a relationship with PRC or 
Taiwan, carried significant leverage, even for states that carried ‘under the table’ 
allegiance to Taiwan, such as the United States.144 Much like Taiwan, the rest of the 
world’s economy was becoming increasingly dependent on Chinese labor markets, 
and this dependence bred de-facto compliance with China’s diplomatic demands.  
However, I argue that recognition was not the goal of these policies. In keeping with 
the idea of ontological security, establishing a firm concept of national identity was 
not dependent on accomplishing independence or diplomatic recognition. China’s 
military actions and rebuke of national rhetoric represented an encroachment on the 
Taiwanese people’s conception of their national Self. The Taiwanese were escaping 
the shame associated with China’s control and manipulation efforts, and by removing 
China’s most prominent control over the island—economic domination, the 
Taiwanese were reestablishing control of their nationhood.  
Ontological security rests on the assumption that states are able to act in ways 
that preserve agency. “Actors might not be able to ‘free’ themselves from international 
context, but they can free their Selves from routines which ultimately damage their 
self-identity”145 Through this lens, interactions with other states become secondary to 
                                                
144 David W. Chang. "U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan." Asian Survey 5, 
no. 3 (1965): 152-60. 
145 Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations. 5.  
 63 
self-preservation. The No Haste policies were internal efforts by the Taiwanese 
government to re-establish a firm national identity. Affirmation from other states was 
not necessary, because these policies were concerted efforts to protect the Taiwanese 
people from their own perceptions of dependence.  
Figure 3 below indicates responses to national identity surveys given by the 
Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in Taiwan. A random phone 
survey was administered every year to roughly 1,000 Taiwanese citizens, and 
respondents were asked to choose how they most identified themselves—as 
exclusively Taiwanese, exclusively Chinese, or Chinese and Taiwanese. During this 
time period, the proportion of those who identified most strongly as Taiwanese 
consistently increased, from 20.2% in 1994, to 41.6% in 2001. The sharpest increase 
in Taiwanese identity occurs between 1996 and 1997, by 9.9 percentage points. This 
time frame coincides with President Lee’s National Development Conference and the 
implementation of the No Haste policies. While these statistics alone in no way prove 
causality, the correspondence along the same timeline lends to the narrative that 
ontological security drove policymaking. For the duration of No Haste, those who 
identified most strongly as Chinese continued to plummet—from 26.2% in 1994 to 
10.6% in 2001.  
.  
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Figure 3 Taiwanese Changes in Identity, 1994-2001 
 
Source: Election Study Center, NCCU Taiwanese/Chinese Identity Survey Results, 
1992–2001 
 
According to realist and liberal theories of political economy, the impact of 
lower total FDI levels would result in the Taiwanese loosening their political positions 
on Taiwanese nationhood, because capital and economic gains shape policy goals. 
Instead, the projection of a uniquely Taiwanese identity inversely correlates with FDI 
levels. While the largest plummet in total FDI occurred between 1997 and 1998, 
Taiwanese identity steadily increases during this period, and the divergence between 
Taiwanese and Chinese identity continuously grows in subsequent years. Similarly, 
the percentage of those who view their national identity as both Taiwanese and 
Chinese is at its largest in 1996, but begins a path towards convergence after the NDC 
and No Haste Policies.  
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This data is significant, because in regard to ethnicity, only 2.3% of Taiwanese 
citizens are ethnically aboriginal Taiwanese. Conversely, more than 95% of 
Taiwanese are ethnically Han Chinese.146 This indicates that although an 
overwhelming majority of Taiwanese citizens cannot claim aboriginal Taiwanese 
ethnicity, they construct their identity in a way that removes themselves from their 
Han Chinese heritage. Taiwanese identity then is almost entirely made up of 
individuals who view their Taiwanese heritage as their most salient national identity. 
Chen Shui-Bian and Liberalization 
 
As previously outlined, Chen Shui-Bian’s presidency signaled a shift in 
Taiwan’s China policy. While this can be seen as a function of simple cost-benefit 
analysis, whereby the financial consequences of protectionism led to reversing prior 
policies, I argue that it is also a result of changing national identity. Because identity is 
socially constructed, it shifts over time in relation to changing priorities and in 
response to one’s environment. Similarly, the relevance of the relationship between 
Taiwan and China in relationship to Taiwanese goals for their nation also varies in 
salience over time.  
 Chen Shui-Bian’s rhetoric indicates that his perception of Taiwan-China 
relations was similar to Lee Teng-Hui’s, but his operationalization of his conception of 
Taiwanese identity resulted in a radically different approach to economic relations. 
Chen won the presidency in 2000 under the Democratic People’s Party (DPP). While 
Lee’s policies and his speech at Cornell in 1996 might indicate that his KMT party 
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was progressive in understanding Taiwan’s independent status, the DPP ran on a 
platform more progressive than the KMT, and won significant support due to their 
insistence on a separate, sovereign Taiwanese state. In fact, the DPP party emerged as 
a direct off-shoot of the nationalist movement. The DPP and nationalist movement 
were so intertwined that “Remember 2/28. Vote for DPP” became a prominent slogan 
for the party147. It is perplexing then that Lee’s and Chen’s party affiliations do not 
directly correlate to similar economic policies that assert independence from China. 
However, a shift in their understanding Taiwanese national identity offers an 
explanation for this phenomenon.  
As Taiwan’s economy expanded and globalization emerged as a defining 
factor in global economic processes, economic growth and financial success became a 
critical component of Taiwanese identity. Identity is multi-faceted, thus incorporating 
economic imperatives into the Taiwanese national conception of selfhood did not 
necessitate the abandonment of sovereignty or independence. Rather, a more complex 
group identity was developed, where economic growth and an autonomous national 
identity could coincide without cognitive dissonance. Psychological theories on 
intergroup conflict support this hypothesis. According to Marilyn Brewer, “the 
potential for intergroup conflict may be reduced in societies that are more complex 
and differentiated along multiple dimensions that are cross-cutting rather than 
perfectly correlated.”148  
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In 2001, President Chen held the Economic Development Advisory 
Conference (EDAC) in order to reassess Taiwan’s economic positions and policies in 
both domestic and international issues.  Despite his party’s allegiance to 
independence, and his previous writings insinuating a deep commitment to Taiwanese 
sovereignty, Chen closed his EDAC conference with a stark shift in policy towards the 
Chinese. “…with regard to the further development of cross-strait relations, the ROC 
government will use the four principles of ‘Taiwan first,’ ‘global perspectives’ 
‘mutually beneficial win-win situation,’ and ‘sound risk management’ to replace the 
current ‘patience over haste’ policy with one of vigorous liberalization and effective 
management.”149 
Much like Lee’s NDC conference 6 years prior, the EDAC consisted of a wide 
range of influential economic and political individuals, and his policies found majority 
support in the legislature. Chen’s narrative did not indicate a departure from DPP 
party commitments, as the DPP continued to promote Taiwanese independence. 
Instead, I argue that this shift in economic policies indicates that economic success 
became a more salient characteristic of Taiwanese national identity, and the 
Taiwanese responded by incorporating both sovereignty and economic growth into 
their conception of national self.  
Increasing the scope of the National Chengchi University statistics previously 
used in this chapter also lends to this narrative. Upon Chen’s inauguration in 2000, 
Taiwanese identity remained high and consistent, in comparison to its previous 
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measures in years past. The liberalization policies were not accompanied by a drop in 
Taiwanese identity because these policies were incorporated into the existing narrative 
of what it meant to be Taiwanese.  
Figure 4 Changes in Taiwanese Identity, 2001-2010 
 
Source: Election Study Center, NCCU Taiwanese/Chinese Identity Survey Results, 
2001-2010.  
 
Instead, these surveys indicate that Chinese identity consistently declines 
throughout this period, with the largest discontinuity occurring in 2014, with a 
difference of 57.1 percentage points, when economic liberalization with China had 
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been absolutely no indication that Chinese and Taiwanese identities will converge. A 
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Literature on nationalism and identity politics provides a thorough framework 
for understanding Taiwanese political economy decisions since democratization. The 
emergence of a strong nationalist movement rooted in postcolonial grievances has 
shaped national security and economic decision-making.  
National identity surveys, combined with rhetoric of both Taiwanese 
presidents, indicate that the Taiwanese leaders, as well as the broader Taiwanese 
public, found an increasingly stronger Taiwanese identity amid stringent economic 
policies that disproportionately harmed their own nation between 1997 and 2001. This 
furthers the assumption that the Taiwanese were willing to sacrifice material wellbeing 
in order to preserve national identity.  
The shift towards economic liberalization after Chen Shui-Bian’s election in 
2000 does not indicate a divergence from this hypothesis. Taiwanese assertions of a 
separate identity steadily increased during this period, and even held at higher levels 
than during the peak of No Haste policies. This is because the flexible nature of 
identity allows individuals and groups to incorporate new priorities into existing 
identity frameworks.  
The following section will explore democratization and how it has operated as 
a mechanism for the development of the nationalist movement in Taiwan.  I assert that 
Taiwan’s democratization process has provided a framework for the Taiwanese to 
develop a strong sense of national identity and that democratic institutions encourage 
shifts in national identity over time in response to international and domestic 
circumstances.  
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Chapter 3: Democratization  
 
The previous chapters have outlined the ways in which national identity and its 
social construction served as the justification for Taiwanese protectionist FDI policies 
between 1997 and 2001. Taiwan’s nationalist movement was critical in informing the 
No Haste policies, so understanding the mechanisms that facilitated the nationalist 
movement is helpful for evaluating the way identity can shape policy. The nationalist 
movement emerged out of Chiang Kai-Shek’s death and Taiwan’s subsequent 
democratization process. In this chapter, I argue that democratization was a key 
foundational component to the emergence of a national identity and that the nature of 
democracy enabled the Taiwanese to both conceive of their unique Taiwanese 
identity, and to create social and political institutions that reinforced it. This chapter 
will begin by examining literature on the intersection of democratization and 
nationalism and then move to exploring Taiwan’s democratization experience. I then 
identify specific domestic political movements that were enacted in response to 
emerging national identity and relate the creation of these policies to Taiwan’s broader 
nationalist movement, and the No Haste Policies specifically.  
Democracy and Nationalism  
 
 At the core of democracy is the concept that “government can be legitimated 
only by the will of those whom it governs.”150 However, all nations must reconcile 
definitional issues of who constitutes the polity. In order for democracy to succeed, it 
is necessary for a nation of individuals to conceive of themselves as of the same 
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nationality and willingly subject themselves to a common governance model. In 
addition, states themselves must define what criteria must be met for individuals to 
become full citizens. Countries have a vast array of differing policies towards 
immigrants, naturalization, and integration requirements, meaning that there is not an 
inherent method for determining membership.151 In this way, democracy is socially 
constructed, because it depends on an entirely subjective idea of who “We the People” 
are.152 
 In addition, the political process within democratic states deviates from 
rationality, namely because political decision-making is conceived of by human 
beings, whose motives and priorities are often bound outside of cost-benefit 
analysis.153 It becomes apparent by simply observing democracy in the United States, 
or any other democracy, that political decision makers often act outside of market 
model decision-making. If deviance from rationality is the norm, perhaps it is 
important to reexamine the way we understand policymaking in democracies. Because 
societal objectives are not bound by objective definitions of right and wrong, analysis 
of decision-making must also be framed in relation to how a state constructs its self-
interest.154 Deborah Stone  proposes an alternative lens for examining political 
decision-making in democratic states—“A model of political reason ought to account 
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for the possibilities of changing one’s objectives, or pursuing contradictory objectives 
simultaneously, of winning by appearing to lose and turning loss into an appearance of 
victory, and most unusual, of attaining objectives by portraying oneself as having 
attained them.”155  This model does not presume an optimal set of democratic 
objectives, but understands that the democratic framework inherently promotes and 
reflects the fluidity of changing societal values. In this way, the deviance from 
standard decision-making criteria is simply the reframing of priorities by individuals 
or societies. When democracy and nationhood are enforced through social 
construction, it is impossible to posit a firm reference point of rationality. Instead, 
understanding a nation’s intentions and goals is best done by examining how 
individuals within the nation construct their identities in relation to others, both within 
the nation and outside. Cost-benefit analysis based on a static set of objectives fails to 
capture the nuance involved in decision-making.  
 Due to the fluid nature of democracies and each state’s differing construct of 
citizenship, it becomes apparent that nationalism and democracy are “joined in a sort 
of complicated marriage, unable to live without each other, but co-existing in an 
almost permanent state of tensions.”156 Through this lens, democracies can be viewed 
on a continuum, where the relationship between perceived homogeneity and 
democracy vary in relation to a nation’s definition of citizenship. Democracies in 
which all legitimacy rests on shared ethnicity have historically been susceptible to 
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repressing minorities, and therefore violate a core tenet of democracies—equality.157 
However, a state cannot exist without its members conceiving of themselves as 
members of a state, thus it is impossible to rid the populous of an inherent sense of 
linked fate.  Democracy and national identity then become mutually constitutive, 
where each necessitates and reinforces the other.    
 The following section will explore Taiwan’s democratization experience and 
highlight prominent components of Taiwan’s civil society that became significant in 
their governing system after 1987. I ultimately argue that the democratization process 
fully facilitated the Taiwanese nationalist movement and that the reform initiatives 
that emerged out of the process reflect the Taiwanese peoples’ attempts to reclaim and 
reestablish a national identity. Further, I assert that much like domestic policies, the 
No Haste policies were also an extension of the Taiwanese’ attempt to build a national 
identity based on an autonomous culture, separate from the nation’s history of 
subjugation.  
Democratization in Taiwan 
 
 While the term “Taiwan Miracle” refers to Taiwan’s economic growth 
experience, it is also appropriately applied to its peaceful democratic transition to a 
multi-party system. As previously described before, the KMT autocratically ruled the 
Taiwanese people for almost 5 decades prior to democratization. Its transition is 
uncommon, in that many other nations exhibiting similar transitions during the third 
wave of democracy failed to exhibit similar levels of stability and peace after 
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transitioning.158 This section will explore why Taiwan was able to smoothly transition 
into democracy, and why the KMT were willing to loosen their control on governance.  
 Central to Taiwan’s democratization was the shift in the KMT’s position 
towards domestic society and opposition politics. In 1987, opposition parties were 
legalized, signaling a release on the monopoly of power by the KMT. Why were the 
KMT willing to loosen their governmental control in Taiwan after almost 50 years of 
autocratic leadership?  
 The KMT led the Taiwanese through exponential economic growth during 
their reign of leadership until democratization. While their governance style was often 
repressive, and memories of the White Terror lingered among older Taiwanese, 
citizens at the same time acknowledged that the KMT were also partly responsible for 
the increasing income and improved livelihoods of the Taiwanese people. By the 
1970s, Taiwan had a burgeoning middle class and a quality infrastructure system.159 
The KMT had helped ensure economic growth and national prosperity was a 
prominent value within Taiwanese culture.160 However, during the 1970s, Taiwan 
experienced a series of diplomatic setbacks, as the nation’s seat in the UN was 
removed, and President Nixon’s visit to PRC solidified Taiwan’s isolation.161 Through 
this lens, the KMT’s willing release on their monopoly of power is reconcilable.  In 
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transitioning to democratization, the KMT party could improve the island’s stature 
with Western nations, and the US specifically, which heavily emphasized the 
importance of democracy during the Cold War era.162 Democratization would put 
Taiwan in stark contrast to China, and potentially lead to diplomatic recognition in the 
future. Similarly, transitioning to democracy would improve their economic standing 
and attract more investors by increasing transparency, which could lead to more global 
recognition.163  
While the KMT demonstrated the ability and willingness to loosen their grip 
on autocratic power, Taiwanese society had a civic culture that was critical to ensuring 
the peaceful transition into a multi-party democracy. The democratic process was an 
evolutionary one for the Taiwanese. Opposition parties were first legalized in 1986, 
but prior to their formalization, Taiwan held elections for local officials in the county 
and city levels, such as city councilmen and small-town mayors.164 The KMT 
permitted these elections because they saw them as opportunities to mobilize support 
for their regime. In addition, the KMT felt little threat to their control because they 
seldom faced serious challenges in these elections. The KMT party had enough 
political power and financial backings to effectively combat opposition through both 
legal and corrupt methods.165 In addition, a small percentage of national legislative 
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seats were opened for electoral competition in 1972. So, the Taiwanese had the 
semblance of a framework for democracy prior to the legalization of opposition 
parties. In addition, the democratic process was evolutionary, in that it wasn’t until 
1992 that all legislative seats were subject to electoral competition.166 Presently, the 
elected president still appoints the Legislative Yuan, the leader of the legislature. In 
this way, Taiwan’s democratization experience is truly Taiwanese and not imported 
from Western nations. In addition, the pacing of the transition ensured that the 
Taiwanese could also develop the proper civic culture and frameworks for democracy 
as their nation slowly incorporated new aspects of democracy into their government. 
By slowly transitioning into a full democracy, the KMT party had time to adapt its 
party platform to garner significant public support, rather than face a sudden death 
upon immediate liberalization. As seen in Lee Teng-hui’s stances and his famous 
speech at Cornell, the KMT was able to shift its party platform in a way that 
emphasized Taiwan’s sovereignty and unique identity—a message that increasingly 
rang true for many Taiwanese. There emerged divisions within the KMT between 
those who still maintained that the primary role of the government was to seek 
reunification with PRC and those who had a progressive understanding of Taiwan as a 
sovereign state. These divisions mainly occurred between younger and older 
generations, with the older generations preferring reunification, and persist even 
today.167 This division simplified the KMT’s ability to transition into democracy, 
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because the older party members were easier to phase out of political office. While the 
KMT’s position towards national history and trade liberalization was often more 
conservative than the DPP, the KMT was able to incorporate itself into the democracy 
model, preventing the party from becoming obsolete. Numerous other nations during 
this same time period transitioned to democracy, many with significantly less success 
than Taiwan, indicating that domestic politics mattered and that creating a democracy 
from within a society rather than simply importing a new government style helped 
ease Taiwan’s transition. 
 What helped facilitate Taiwan’s vibrant civic culture? Daniel Lynch argues 
that, more broadly, Taiwan’s increasingly globalized economy and interactions with 
other nation-states acted as a socialization tool to encourage the importation of 
democracy through engaged citizens.168 Notably, Taiwanese children began to be 
widely educated in Western nations in the 1960s. By experiencing the culture and civil 
society of other nations, these students began to compare the Taiwanese governance 
model to that of their Western counterparts, and the United States specifically. 
Students studying abroad were exposed to the civil rights movement, as well as anti-
government and feminist movements. Exposure to opposition movements positioned 
many Taiwanese students to view their homeland in a different light, as well.  These 
students came to see that “in many ways, Taiwan was a classic imperial outpost.”169 
Exposure to Western norms help facilitate the diffusion and localization of these 
norms into Taiwanese society in ways that allowed the Taiwanese to fully adopt them 
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as their own and then facilitate movements that adhered to their new understanding of 
global society.170 
An increased awareness of global inequalities and exposure to protest 
movements helped facilitate a strong protest culture in Taiwan, too. The period 
between Chiang Kai-shek’s death and formal democratization was marked by a variety 
of protests, some of the most prominent being student protests in universities 
advocating for the liberalization of university regulations.171  The importance of this 
protest culture is highlighted by the fact that of the 9 Asian countries that 
democratized during the third wave of democracy, 8 of them had strong protest 
cultures as well.172 While some theories of democratization highlight the importance 
of  economic progress, colonial experiences, and religious backgrounds in facilitating 
successful democracies, it seems that the strongest indicator for transition in Asia 
during the third wave was a protest culture that was nationwide, supported by the 
middle class and refused to relent until demands were met.173  
In addition, Lynch argues that Taiwanese students abroad were also exposed to 
the Sino-centric view of Chinese history that dominated many Western understandings 
of East Asia. For old historians, China was simply “a concept of convenience” that 
homogenized the multiplicity of cultures and experiences in East Asia—and for 
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Taiwanese students, diminished the individuality of their people.174 So, while 
education outside their homeland provided these Taiwanese students with a broader 
understanding of their culture through socialization and unveiled the inequalities that 
were deeply rooted into Taiwanese society at the hands of the KMT, students were 
also exposed to the ways that western culture had also diminished the significance of 
Taiwan in favor of a homogenized conception of China. Their awareness helped 
facilitate an active civic culture that became so central to Taiwan’s reform process. 
In conclusion, Taiwan’s democratization experience was facilitated by a 
multitude of factors that resulted from the nation’s increasing global prominence and 
interactions with democratic states along economic and diplomatic lines, as well as the 
socialization of Taiwanese citizens in cultures immersed in various opposition 
movements, allowing Taiwanese to understand their own culture, history, and 
experiences in light of colonization. These factors were critical in ensuring that 
democratization wasn’t simply imported, but fully embraced by the Taiwanese people 
as method for asserting and exploring their national identity.  
 The following sections will explore the avenues in which Taiwanese citizens 
leveraged their political system to further their goals to develop a national narrative 
surrounding Taiwan as a separate and valuable culture. These reform processes 
furthered that nationalist movement in Taiwan, but they are fully a byproduct of their 
democratization process and the norms and institutions that were a function of it.  
“De-Chiang Kai-Shek-ification” 
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 The KMT regime rested largely on the personality of Chiang Kai-Shek. In fact, 
the first statue of Chiang emerged just 192 days after the island was ceded to China 
after Japan’s loss in WWII.175 Prior to exile to Taiwan, Chiang’s efforts to legitimize 
his Chinese nationalist party centered around himself, as the embodiment of Chinese 
culture and Confucian values.176 His efforts were fortified through social organizations 
that idolized Chiang and his wife as “China’s first couple”.177 As many within China 
sought a charismatic, strong leader, Chiang’s image fit their expectations, and they 
reinforced it through propaganda.178 Central to the narrative surrounding Chiang was 
his position as “Asia’s man of destiny”, in that Chiang claimed to embody what the 
new future of China would be.179 So upon his exile to Taiwan, the nation simply 
became the “island of destiny”, whereby Chiang would patiently wait until he could 
return to the Mainland and reclaim his mantle of leadership.180 Upon Taiwan’s 
retrocession to Chiang’s nationalists, Chiang and his followers simply leveraged 
existing artists and sculptors within Taiwan to create works of art made in Chiang’s 
image. The KMT government then created the General Political Department, which 
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was responsible for texts and artworks honoring Chiang and his leadership over the 
island.  The images and rhetoric that emerged surrounding Chiang placed him as a 
figure who “never aged and whose tenure was permanent and unchanging.”181 This 
provided Chiang’s leadership with a mythical-like quality, insinuating that his 
leadership was bounded outside of time. The idea that his leadership transcended time 
helped ensure that “Chiang’s name and image became fixtures in state rituals, items of 
government pageantry with a significance equivalent to that of the national flag or 
anthem.”182 So, while Chiang and his wife welcomed their glorification, their efforts 
were legitimized by a small supportive group of idolizers, as well as artists who were 
unwilling participants in Chiang’s projection of god-like-ness.  In addition, Chiang’s 
self-projection as a leader who transcended time solidified his image as a leader than 
encompassed more than just a government position. His suppression of opposition 
ensured a singular narrative surrounding his governance, thus exposing the Taiwanese 
to a singular, unified definition of Chiang’s role in Taiwan. 
 Chiang’s death in 1975 positioned his son, Chiang Ching-kuo to take over his 
leadership role. Ching-kuo reaffirmed his father’s personality cult by printing his 
portrait on banknotes and erecting the Chiang Kai-Shek Memorial Hall in Taipei.183 
Roads, buildings, and holidays were dedicated in honor of Chiang. In addition, Ching-
kuo created the China Youth Corps, a national group consisting of schoolchildren, 
which encouraged public acts of patriotism to honor Chiang.184 Ching-kuo’s efforts to 
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memorialize Chiang Kai-shek ensured that a cult of personality developed around the 
Chiang Kai-shek—not just the office of the presidency.185   
 As noted previously, democratization in 1987 enabled the Taiwanese to 
explore their national identity freely for the first time. As an extension of this, 
discussions of Chiang’s role in 2/28, as well as his suppression of Taiwanese culture, 
led many Taiwanese to question his prominence in public spaces. But, the process of 
reassessing the cult of personality surrounding Chiang was slow.186 In fact, for the first 
year of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, Lee still led efforts during Taiwan’s National Day 
to commemorate Chiang’s successes as a military leader, and actually reintroduced 
military parades, which had not been used in almost a decade.187 However, as Lee’s 
presidency carried on, references to Chiang slowly disappeared, and by 1996 there 
were no references to Chiang during Taiwan’s National Day celebration.188  
 Efforts to reevaluate Chiang’s role in Taiwan’s history were led by multiple 
groups, including civic groups and the competing political parties.  The KMT and DPP 
had differing views of how Chiang’s memory should be handled. The KMT held a 
more conservative view, and aimed to protect Chiang’s historical legacy, while the 
DPP insisted on the removal of all references to Chiang.  Civic organizations held an 
array of positions, and many of the issues the groups centered around issues that, 
although not directly organized around opposition to Chiang’s legacy, addressed 
grievances that were in direct relation to Chiang’s leadership, and advocated for 
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positions that diminished Chiang’s legacy on the island. Some of these movements 
included the Human Rights Promotion Association, which championed the rights of 
political prisoners from Chiang’s era of authoritarian rule and his suppression of 
dissidents.189 Similarly, the Hakka Rights Movement centered around the provision of 
more indigenous rights and recognition in Taiwan. During Chiang’s rule, the Hakka 
were systematically denied aspects of their culture, including their language and 
historical traditions, by Chiang’s narrative of Chinese nationalist identity.190  While 
differing in objectives and degree of opposition to Chiang, the formal political parties, 
as well as a variety of civil organizations, all advocated for the reappraisal of Chiang’s 
legacy on the Taiwanese people. This process of reexamination came to be known as 
QuJianghua, interpreted as “de-Chiang-Kai-Shek-ification”.191  
 Chiang’s decreasing prominence in Taiwanese society was also indicated by 
the transfer of the national holiday celebrating Chiang’s birthday on October 31. 
Instead of being observed consistently on the 31st, as had historically been done, the 
holiday was moved to the last Saturday in October to avoid a loss in worker 
productivity during the year.192 This transition was symbolic of the decreasing 
prominence of Chiang in modern Taiwanese society, and indicated that honoring 
Chiang was more a function of ritualization rather than dedication to his memory. 
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While this did not represent the total abolishment of Chiang’s role in Taiwanese 
history, it did point to the destruction of his personality cult.  
 Out of the Taiwanese’ efforts to re-evaluate Chiang’s legacy on their nation, 
there emerged two main approaches that activist groups and the government took in 
reassessing public spaces once dedicated to the ruler. The first approach was to ‘return 
to the people’ spaces once dedicated to the memorialization of Chiang, and the other 
was to erase all references to Chiang Kai-shek, in order to reestablish a new Taiwan-
centric form of national identity. These different methods of managing Chiang’s 
legacy indicate the differing views towards his role in national history. The difference 
in these methods of reform highlight the democratic nature of the process, as activist 
organizations and the competing parties within the legislature disagreed on how the 
transformation should operate.   
An example of the first approach of reexamining Chiang’s legacy was Chen 
Shui-bian’s efforts as mayor of Taipei to turn Chiang Kai-Shek’s personal residence 
into a public park and museum in 1996.193 This was symbolic of the democratization 
process, in that it allowed the Taiwanese people to explore and determine for 
themselves the meaning of Chiang’s legacy by positioning artifacts of his leadership 
and personal life within the public sphere. In contrast, prior to democratization, 
“Chiang did not qualify as a critical topic of academic study.”194 The museum 
represented an attempt by Chen to facilitate a national discourse on Taiwan’s own 
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history and reclaim a past that had been monopolized by colonialism. As an example 
of the latter method of reappraising Chiang Kai-shek, in 1994 a road in Taipei named 
after Chiang was rededicated as Ketagalan Boulevard, the name of an indigenous 
tribe.195  This was completed unilaterally, without legislative input, but found little 
resistance from the Taiwanese public because it was presented as a symbolic 
‘reclaiming’ of Taiwanese heritage. Eliminating his presence from Taiwanese civic 
life also discarded his views from their prominence in Taiwan’s historical and civic 
narrative.  While removing remnants of an autocratic leader is clearly a function of 
democratic transition, in that it represented the dismantling of a former government 
system, more deeply, removing Chiang Kai-shek’s memory from the public sphere 
embodied the Taiwanese public’s attempts to create a new identity founded on a 
conception of a unique Taiwanese heritage.  
The de-Chiang-Kai-shek-ification process was fully a function of the 
Taiwanese peoples’ exploration of their identity in response to their new freedoms 
found within democratization. This is evidenced by the uneven and often contradicting 
efforts to remove Chiang Kai-shek’s images or enable a broader public discourse 
surrounding his role in Taiwanese history.  In addition, the process was not quickly 
done. In fact, Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport wasn’t renamed until 2006, and 
the most prominent commemorative piece of architecture, the Chiang Kai-Shek 
Memorial Palace, wasn’t renamed to National Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall until 
2008, 21 years after democratization.196 Presently, there are still scattered statues 
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throughout Taiwan constructed in Chiang’s honor.197  The nature of the de-Chiang-
Kai-shek-ification process is indicative that the dismantling of memorials honoring 
Chiang was not a function of nation-building or a state-sanctioned nationalist project, 
but rather the byproduct of a democratized populace with various political and social 
goals. 
Textbook Reform 
 
National school curriculum can offer deep insight into the cultural norms 
within societies. When textbooks are managed at the national level, as they had 
historically been in Taiwan, they reflect a state narrative of what constitutes national 
values. Textbooks also help shape attitudes towards historical events and characters as 
well as determine what part of national history is significant enough to be included in 
a national narrative.198 History curriculum is a powerful socialization tool within both 
democratic and autocratic nations, where government regimes can ensure the 
perpetuation of uniformity of thought. Thus, Taiwan’s campaign for textbook reform 
shortly after democratization represents a significant shift in government priorities, as 
well as a new national narrative and identity. In analyzing the textbook reform 
process, I aim to situate textbook reform as a mode of reinforcing a new national 
identity, and as representative of the transformation of power from centralized 
government to localized control. These intertwined processes were fully facilitated by 
Taiwan’s democratic transition.  
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 Taiwan’s national history curriculum has historically been developed by the 
Ministry of Education (MOE). Between 1949 and the early 1990s, textbooks reflected 
a Chinese nationalist perspective, with Chinese heritage central to historical narratives. 
Taiwan was treated as appendage of the mainland, with a shared culture and history. 
Very little revisions in textbooks were made during this period. The MOE strictly 
dictated education policy in Taiwan, and had the explicit goal of using education as a 
political socialization tool.199 In fact, Article 158 of the 1947 constitution overtly 
asserts the political goals of national education— “education culture must develop the 
nationalist spirit of the citizens.”200 
As Taiwan transitioned into democracy, national history curriculum underwent 
a similar shift in perspective, namely because education policy was divested from the 
bureaucratic MOE, with more power given to principals and teachers. The localization 
of authority was accompanied by a broader deregulation of education policy.201 This 
decentralization was made possible through Taiwan’s Civil Organizations Law of 
1989, which legalized civic groups and provided Taiwanese citizens with additional 
avenues of political organization and participation. For the first time in generations, 
Taiwanese with common interests could advocate for reform. A large number of civic 
groups emerged, focusing on a wide array of social issues, including environmental 
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concerns, public safety, income distribution, and education.202 Taiwan’s budding civil 
society helped expand government policy to focus on issues of direct concern citizens, 
rather than the national objectives the KMT developed in a top-down manner. 
Education reform began with pressure from the newly developed civil 
education groups, which helped lead to the formation of the Commission on 
Educational Reform (CER).203 Through their protests, conferences, and meetings with 
education officials, these civic groups pressured the government to take steps towards 
education reform. University students also played a strong role in the movement by 
staging protests against the MOE, demanding education leaders make significant 
changes in curriculum, and labeling education bureaucrats “history criminals”.204  In 
response to their strong advocacy, the CER was established in 1994 as an independent 
entity—separate from the MOE. While subject to input from MOE leaders, the CER 
operated with the sole agenda of developing school curriculum that reflected the 
desires of the Taiwanese community. The CER was not composed of government 
bureaucrats, but was led by a Nobel laureate and numerous university presidents and 
professors.205 Between 1994 and 1997, the CER held hearings, seminars, and public 
forums, soliciting input from parents, teachers, principals, and other education interest 
groups. In 1997, the CER submitted its reform recommendations to the MOE.  
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 The new curriculum that emerged out of the CER’s recommendations was 
called “Knowing Taiwan”.206 This curriculum included new textbooks for history, 
geography, and society (social studies). The aim of the curriculum was to rid 
Taiwanese education of ideological motives, opposed to the prior system that 
proselytized “The Greater Han Ideology”.207 Notably, the history curriculum 
reexamined the Japanese colonial period, which was previously written in light of the 
Chinese trauma from the First Sino-Japanese War. Most importantly, the textbooks 
emphasized Taiwan’s “historical plurality”, which directly contradicted the Chinese 
narrative of Taiwan as a part of linear Chinese history, lacking reference to the 
aboriginal population, as well as Taiwan’s numerous colonial experiences. The new 
perspective was emphasized with the goal of exposing Taiwanese students to an 
international vision to “stand on Taiwan, have consideration for China, open their eyes 
to the world.”208 Understanding Taiwan as a separate historical entity, and then 
exploring its relationship to other nations, including the Chinese, was central to this 
history perspective. Chinese history was still included in the Taiwanese education 
system, but new course requirements included a separate Taiwanese history course in 
secondary schools that was to precede any courses on Chinese history.  
Taiwan’s new history curriculum, in addition to broader educational reforms, 
refocused Taiwan’s educational system to encourage the localization of Taiwanese 
culture, rather than top-down generated Chinese nationalist education. For example, in 
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1998 the Law on Education for Aborigines was passed to legalize the rights of 
indigenous peoples to learn their native languages, such as Hakka and Minnanese, 
which had been strictly outlawed during KMT autocratic rule.209 The result of 
education reform was an increasingly localized education system that provided 
relative agency to teachers, encouraged culturally relevant teachings, and centered 
around the Taiwanese as a separate and significant nationality.  
The democratization process led to the emergence of localized civic groups by 
instilling value to the opinions and concerns of the Taiwanese people, who had 
previously been denied this privilege by Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalist regime. 
Taiwan’s nationalist movement is reflected in education curriculum, but it is the 
democratic process that facilitated both of these movements.  
Education reform was spearheaded by those outside of the federal 
government—civic groups composed of students, parents, teachers, who personally 
advocated for reconstruction of the education system. Prior literature indicates that 
textbook reform was a state-sponsored nation-building exercise, but I argue this 
assessment is misplaced.210 While the Taiwanese government participated in the 
reform process, government participation emerged out of pressure and protest from 
Taiwanese citizens. The CER operated independently of the MOE, and its 
recommendations came from citizens with a vested interest in education, not politics. 
In addition, the creation of textbooks was decentralized during this period as well, 
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allowing schools to make choices regarding the adoption of history textbooks within a 
broader market of private companies, which also operated outside government 
management.  
Conclusion 
 
 Democratization and National Identity in Taiwan 
 
 In light of these characteristics of education reform, as well as the QuJianghua, 
movement, it becomes evident that these democratic reforms were facilitated by 
Taiwan’s new democracy. However, it is also apparent that Taiwan’s emerging 
national identity was necessary for the emergence of these reforms. I argue that 
Taiwan’s democratization process and nationalist movement were mutually 
constitutive and equally necessary for the emergence of one another. Taiwan’s 
growing economy necessitated an exposure to Western culture and the inequalities that 
infiltrate it, which in turn provided an opportunity for national introspection. This 
provided the fuel for the relatively peaceful transition out of martial law and into 
democracy. As Taiwan transitioned into a multi-party system, democratization 
provided outlets for numerous civic groups to advocate for reform.   
Essential to the democratization experience was the KMT’s peaceful 
relinquishment on their monopoly of power. This can also partly be explained through 
the national identity lens. Because KMT leadership was able to view democratization 
as critical to Taiwan’s economic growth and diplomatic future, their willingness to 
expand the political field to opposition was more justified. KMT leadership saw the 
shifting landscape of Taiwanese identity and adjusted their platform to best serve 
Taiwan as a nation. While this was in no way a seamless transition, nor entirely 
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peaceful, it’s relative success is significant. While economic imperative explains a 
portion of the KMT’s willingness to expand the government system, it is namely 
because economic growth had become such a significant portion of Taiwanese identity 
that it became feasible for the transition. Numerous nations faced with a juncture of 
economic growth or maintaining strict control of power would choose the latter. In 
this way, Taiwan’s democratization movement was deeply intertwined with the 
nation’s growing understanding of Taiwanese identity in light of its’ increasingly 
globalized position in the world economy. 
Democratization and the No Haste Policies  
 
What is the relationship between Taiwan’s 1996 No Haste Policies and 
Taiwan’s democratization process? Much like textbook reform and QuJinghua, No 
Haste represented Taiwanese attempts to reclaim their nation’s autonomy, rid of 
influence from outsiders. As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2, this is most indicated 
through President Lee’s rhetoric following the incident, as well as Chinese newspaper 
pieces, which insist that The Taiwan Strait Crisis, National Development Conference, 
and No Haste policies were created in response to threats on sovereignty and national 
identity, not primarily out of fear of economic dependence.211  For domestic reforms, 
the process of asserting national identity involved dismantling Chiang Kai-shek’s 
control over public spaces, such as streets and buildings, as well as his control over 
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historical narrative.  Similarly, No Haste involved removing Chinese control over 
economic growth. Each of these processes reflected the formation of a new national 
identity.  
Much like domestic reform processes facilitated through democratization, the 
No Haste policies were implemented with the consent and urging of a multiplicity of 
groups with various interests. These policies were not simply a function of top-down 
policymaking. As outlined in chapter 1, members of the National Development 
Conference in 1996 consisted of a variety of different leaders from academia, 
economics, politics, and other prominent figures in Taiwanese society. The No Haste 
policies found widespread support within the NDC, as well as throughout the broader 
Taiwanese public, as evidenced in public opinion polls.212 The nature of the 
implementation of these policies then similarly reflects Taiwan’s domestic reforms, in 
that efforts to assert national identity were championed by Taiwanese citizens rather 
than unilaterally imposed, as had been the case prior to democratization.  
In order to understand the No Haste policies as a function of the 
democratization process, it is important to view the implementation of the economic 
policies in context. At a glance, these protectionist measures can be viewed as an 
attempt to diversify Taiwan’s economy or retaliate for China’s actions during the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis, but when viewed with an understanding the of the domestic 
reforms that were occurring during the same time period, as well as Taiwan’s history 
of suppression, it becomes apparent that democratization enabled the Taiwanese to 
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shape and assert their national identity in new ways, and restricting investments into 
China was an attempt to protect the Taiwanese’ new conception of their national 
identity. For the first time, the Taiwanese were in full command of ensuring 
government policies, both domestic and international, mirrored the ways the 
Taiwanese conceived of themselves. The KMT had denied the Taiwanese self-
governance and imposed a Sino-centric identity into civic and educational life for 
more than four decades, and as Taiwan ascended into the global economy, China was 
continuing to leverage its diplomatic power and economic prominence to ensure 
Taiwan was denied sovereignty. These separate powers—the KMT and Communist 
China—had different intentions in their suppression of Taiwanese culture and 
autonomy, but their existence represented a similar threat.  
The KMT and PRC made attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the 
Taiwanese state, but Taiwanese citizens were only fully able to address these threats to 
identity because of the removal of martial law in 1987 and subsequent democratization 
process.  Had Taiwanese society not gone through a democratic transition, efforts to 
explore and assert their national identity would have been suppressed by the KMT via 
repressive autocratic rule and continued Chinese Nationalist indoctrination. Similarly, 
without democratization, Taiwanese citizens wouldn’t have been able to vocally 
challenge China’s narrative of “One Country, Two Systems”.  In this way, 
democratization was critical for the full development of a new national identity 
narrative that was so central to both domestic reforms and economic relations with 
China.   
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Conclusion 
 
The previous chapters have outline the ways in which Taiwan’s protectionist 
FDI policies towards China were a function of the nation’s emerging nationalist 
movement. This movement which was a direct response to democratization, but also a 
facilitator of the democratization movement. The interconnectedness of these 
processes and movements indicate the unique political and economic environment 
within the nation. They also highlight the importance in understanding both historical 
and present domestic context when examining the economic decision-making process 
in countries.  
Summary 
 
 President Lee’s No Haste policies were responsible for a sharp decrease in 
foreign direct investment into China between 1996 and 2001.213 Despite the fact that 
these policies disproportionately hurt the nation in comparison to China, as well as 
Taiwan’s prominent wealthy business community, these policies found wide support 
among Taiwanese citizens, and were broadly supported by an array of politicians and 
experts during Lee’s NDC in which the policies were formulated.214 While it can be 
viewed that these major FDI restrictions were an attempt to simply reduce Chinese 
market dependence, in order to diversify Taiwan’s economy, Lee’s rhetoric indicates 
that these policies were positioned as a national security initiative. “Taiwan First” 
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became Lee’s rallying cry for these policies, which were championed as initiatives that 
promoted a separate Taiwanese identity.215  
 For the Taiwanese, grievances against the Chinese rest in the island’s legacy of 
colonialism. Although experiencing numerous forms of colonialism from a variety of 
imperialist powers, the most prominent within Taiwanese culture today is their 
experience with the KMT nationalist reign after World War II. The KMT’s legacy was 
littered with atrocity and the violation of human rights, including the February 28th 
Incident and ensuing White Terror.216 While KMT leadership was discontinuous from 
the PRC, the nature of their rule subjected the Taiwanese to a double-colonialist 
experience, because the KMT claimed to fully represent Chinese leadership, and 
insisted the Taiwanese abandon all aspects of their heritage. After Chiang Kai-shek’s 
death and the emergence of Taiwan’s nationalist movement, Taiwan’s new ‘other’ 
became the PRC. As China took significant steps to bar the Taiwanese from 
diplomatic recognition and responded to Taiwan’s independence assertions with 
military strikes across the strait, their efforts to deny the Taiwanese people their 
identity and heritage sharply resembled the KMT’s. Memories of the past shaded 
Taiwan’s decision-making decades after atrocity.217 
At surface level, decisions by Taiwanese leadership to heavily restrict 
investments into China between 1996 and 2001 seem counterintuitive for a nation that 
had prioritized industrialization and rapid economic growth for several decades prior. 
Economic protectionism did not reflect the “Taiwan Miracle”, where privatization and 
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an export-oriented economy had help the nation ascend into the ranks of other highly 
developed nations.218 Taiwan’s economic security was placed at risk with the 
implementation of these restrictions, but I have argued that financial security was 
secondary to the protection of the national self. Military strikes across the strait on 
behalf of the Chinese represented a threat to the Taiwanese’ conception of their 
identity as a separate and sovereign nation with an autonomous culture from the 
Chinese, which theorists argue is so foundational that individuals, and societies, are 
willing to sacrifice material and physical wellbeing if it ensures the protection of their 
ontological security.219   
But how, and why did the Taiwanese have a sudden resurgence of nationalist 
sentiment during the late half of the 20th century? Taiwan’s democratization process 
contributed heavily to the exploration of Taiwanese identity by promoting interactions 
between civil organizations and the government and increasing localized control of 
policymaking. The freedoms associated with governmental liberalization promoted a 
culture that responded in a variety of ways to perceived exploitation and suffering. 
These movements are demonstrated through Taiwan’s textbook reform and 
QuJianghua process. Both of these movements were rooted in the desire for systems 
that respected the unique Taiwanese heritage and culture, rid of colonialist attitudes.  
In these ways, democratization and Taiwan’s nationalist movement mutually 
reinforced one another, leading to the No Haste policies. The democratization process 
facilitated a civic culture that developed deep sentiments towards Taiwan’s 
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sovereignty. Civic groups emerged in response to a variety of issues that affected 
Taiwanese identity, and although international in nature, the No Haste policies can be 
viewed as an extension of this trend towards localized movements. The manner in 
which the No Haste policies were created, as well as the broad support of No Haste 
across the political spectrum, is reflective of the trend towards localization of the 
nationalist movement. Thus, both domestic and international nationalist reform 
processes were made possible through democratization.  
State Decision Making and Ontological Security 
 
I have previously discussed the ways in which democratization allowed 
national identity to become a salient priority in Taiwan’s national consciousness, 
which resulted in domestic reforms as well as a sharp turn in economic relations with 
China. These processes served to reinforce one another, in that democratization 
provided an outlet for the Taiwanese to develop and assert their identity, and 
movements centered around national identity allowed Taiwan’s nationalist movement 
to increase in prominence within the country’s culture, as well as public policies. 
What underlies both of these processes is the desire to protect Taiwan’s 
conception of its national self in response to a perceived threat. Due to 
democratization, the Taiwanese were able to explore and redefine their conception of 
what it meant to be Taiwanese. As a nation with a history steeped in repression and 
denial of culture and an autonomous history, the Taiwanese created a national identity 
that opposed prior narratives created by and imposed on the Taiwanese by the KMT 
and PRC.  Both Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist regime and Deng Xiaoping’s PRC 
aimed to define Taiwan as an extension of a linear Chinese history. Chiang 
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successfully suppressed alternative narratives through physical violence, as seen in 
2/28 and The White Terror, while the PRC pushed Taiwan into diplomatic isolation 
and made efforts to increase economic dependence to prevent the Taiwanese people 
from asserting an alternative narrative.  Textbook reform, QuJianghua, and No Haste 
are simply reiterations of Taiwan’s attempts to protect their identity from these threats.  
According to constructivist theory, the security of identity is so foundational to 
states that physical and economic security can be willingly sacrificed in order to 
protect it.220 For the Taiwanese, whose modern economic history has earned it the title 
of Taiwan Miracle, and whose citizens still overwhelmingly value economic growth 
above all other national priorities, restricting investments across the Taiwan Strait 
came with large financial consequences, but the Taiwanese widely supported these 
policies because they protected their national narrative of what it meant to be 
Taiwanese.221 
Cross-Strait Relations, 2001 and Beyond 
 
Upon President Chen’s election, and continuing into current times, Taiwan’s 
economy has trended towards a broad liberalization, which included sharp reductions 
in the heavy restrictions the MOEA had placed on foreign investments into China. 
One of the most recent developments in economic relations across the strait is the 
Economic Cooperative Framework Agreement (ECFA). Signed in 2010, ECFA 
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slashes tariffs on 539 tariffs on Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese exports 
to Taiwan.222  
However, this shift in policy does not reflect an abandonment of Taiwan’s 
nationalist sentiment, but rather an evolution of their national identity. The ECFA 
agreement makes explicit references to Taiwan’s sovereignty and unique relationship 
with China— “The ECFA will not follow the model of agreements signed by 
mainland China with Hong Kong and Macau. ECFA negotiations…take into full 
consideration the distinct characteristics of cross-strait relations.”223 This economic 
agreement highlights Taiwan’s new ability to insist that nations respect their 
autonomy, while still fully engaging in the globalized economy. 
 The ECFA signals that the Taiwanese people have adapted what it means to 
be “Taiwanese” in a way that doesn’t necessitate total economic independence on 
China. In this way, the Taiwanese can conceive of themselves as being wholly 
Taiwanese while simultaneously participating in trade and investments with the 
Chinese, without feeling their core values and identity are infringed upon. This 
evolution is due to Taiwan’s socialization with other states, allowing citizens and 
leaders to construct their identity in a way that permits both global engagement and 
national pride. 
Implications 
 
Taiwan’s nationalist experience and resultant protectionist trade policies are 
relevant for modern nations as well. Modern populist movement rhetoric is incredibly 
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reminiscent to Taiwan’s “Taiwan First” mantra, including the 2016 Brexit vote and the 
election of Donald Trump as president of the United States. In viewing Taiwan as a 
case study, it becomes apparent that a simple cost-benefit analysis fails to capture the 
justification for self-harming policies or goals, economic or otherwise. “Rationality” is 
too narrow a lens for comprehending the fullness of human interactions. The security 
of the national self, as demonstrated through No Haste, is so foundational that it 
transcends financial wellbeing.  This must be fully understood in order to account for 
the actions of nations in situations where self-harming decisions are championed 
within a nation.  In addition, Taiwan’s economic restrictions were part of a larger 
nationalist narrative, and viewing these policies outside of Taiwan’s unique historical 
experience, as well as their newly formed democracy, was critical for proper analysis. 
This level of analysis must be applied to modern populist movements as well, in order 
to discover the situational influences on decision-making. Similarly, in seeking policy 
solutions to address nationalist movements, history matters. Solutions must address 
the root of these sentiments, rather than treat the symptoms.  
 However, Taiwan can also offer insight into the longevity of these movements 
in light of the malleable nature of identity. Taiwan’s shift towards liberalization in 
2001 did not represent a repression of national identity, but rather an accommodation 
in what it meant to be Taiwanese. President Chen led efforts to spearhead a new era of 
broad liberalization, while still maintaining his allegiance to Taiwan as a separate and 
sovereign nation state with an autonomous history from PRC. Since 1995, tensions 
between Taiwan and China have oscillated, but without any threat of military 
interference, while the amount of Taiwanese who identify purely as Taiwanese has 
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steadily increased.224 For modern nationalist movements, this shift lends hope to 
modern populist movements, that national pride and economic cooperation can 
coincide with one another.   
Areas for Further Research  
 
 Taiwan’s history of colonialism and its impact on present day issues of 
nationalism and economics indicate that legacies of western imperialism have long-
standing consequences. Because colonialism has impacted a large majority of 
developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia, it becomes valuable to understand 
the relationship between colonialist history and modern day economic policies. How 
do modern post-colonialist states interact with their former colonizer? Is there an 
archetypal economic relationship between colonized and colonizers? Does a history of 
exploitation lead to negative economic interactions with the former colonizer? 
Similarly, it could be valuable to understand the legacy of imperialism on the 
construction of identity. What are the impacts of colonialism on national identity in 
other states? Does a colonialist past lead to a more ethnocentric national identity? 
Studying these fields could have significant impact on post-colonialist states.  
In addition, the ability of the Taiwanese to shift their conception of national 
self in order to accommodate economic cooperation is fascinating. Further research 
exploring how and when national identity transitions occur would be valuable for a 
broad set of modern day nationalist movements and an in light of a global increase in 
economic protectionism. When nationalist movements become harmful to minorities 
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and outsiders, understanding ways in which ethnocentric attitudes can be shifted to 
incorporate a more inclusive understanding of national self would be invaluable to 
international organizations, even as an intervention tool. Taiwan’s resurgence of 
nationalism after democracy created resentful attitudes towards mainland Chinese, but 
did not escalate to violence. Other ethnic conflicts—Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, 
Myanmar, Darfur—just to name a few—created tremendous human suffering. Thus, 
the international community would have a vested interest in understanding the facets 
of national identity and under what circumstances it becomes malleable.  
 
  
 104 
References 
 
Acharya, Amitav. “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norman Localization 
and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism.” International Organization 
58, no. 2 (2004): 239-75.  
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. New York: Verso, 1983. 
 
“Appendix 80—President Lee Tenghui Cornell Commencement Address (1995),” 
East Asia Peace and Security Initiative. Accessed February 6, 2018.  
https://www.eapasi.com/uploads/5/5/8/6/55860615/appendix_80_--
_president_lee_tenghui_cornell_commencement_address.pdf 
 
Barbieri, Katherine. "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of 
Interstate Conflict?". Journal of Peace Research 33, no. 1 (1996): 29-49. 
 
Barrett, Richard E., and Martin King Whyte. "Dependency Theory and Taiwan: 
Analysis of a Deviant Case." American Journal of Sociology 87, no. 5 (1982): 
1064-89. 
 
Bhabha, Homi K. Nation and Narration. London: New York: Routledge, 1990. 
 
Brewer, Marilynn B. "The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup 
Hate?" Journal of Social Issues 55, no. 3 (1999): 429-44. 
 
Brown, Kerry, Justin Hempson-Jones, and Jessica Pennisi. Investment Across the 
Taiwan Strait: How Taiwan’s Relationship with China Affects its Position in 
the Global Economy. November 2014. 
 
Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis. 1992. 
 
Chang, David W. "U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan." Asian Survey 5, no. 3 
(1965): 152-60. 
 
Chao, Linda, Ramon H. Myers, and James A. Robinson. "Promoting Effective 
Democracy, Chinese Style: Taiwan's National Development 
Conference." Asian Survey 37, no. 7 (1997): 669-82. doi:10.2307/2645515. 
 
Chen, David W. David “Taiwan’s President Tiptoes Around Politics at Cornell,” The 
New York Times, June 10, 1995. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/world/taiwan-s-president-tiptoes-around-
politics-at-cornell.html. 
 
Chen, Ezra N. H. “The Economic Integration of Taiwan and China and Its 
Implications for Cross-strait Relations.” Projects at Harvard, Weatherhead 
 105 
Center for International Affairs (2003/07). 
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/chen.pdf  
 
Chen Shui-bian. "China Policy White Paper across the Century." Chinese Law & 
Government 35, no. 5 (1999): 64. 
 
Chen Xiangming. "Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: "Go West, but 
Also Go South"." Asian Survey 36, no. 5 (1996): 447-67. 
 
Ching, Leo T. S. Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity 
Formation. University of California Press. 2001. 7. 
 
Chu, David K. Y. “The Special Economic Zones of China and Their Impact on Its 
Economic Development.” The China Quarterly 158 (1999): 496-97. 
 
“Cornell University Alumni Reunion,” C-Span, June 9, 1995. Accessed December 13, 
2017. https://www.c-span.org/video/?65610-1/cornell-university-alumni-
reunion. 
  
Dawson, Michael C. Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics. 
Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey. 1994. 
 
Deng, Ping. "Taiwan's Restriction of Investment in China in the 1990s: A Relative 
Gains Approach." Asian Survey 40, no. 6 (2000): 958-80. 
 
Ditmer, Lowell. “Taiwan’s Aim-Inhibited Quest for Identity and the China Factor.” 
Journal of Asian and African Studies. 30 no. 1-2. 1 February 2005. 
 
Dreyer, June Teufel. “Taiwan’s Evolving Identity.” Paper presented at the Woodrow 
Wilson International Institute for Scholars, Washington D.C., July 17, 2003. 
 
Druckman, Daniel. “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social 
Psychological Perspective.” Mershon International Studies Review Vol. 38, 
No. 1 (April 2004): 43-68. 
 
Feenstra, Robert C. “How Costly is Protectionism?” Journal on Economic 
Perspectives. 6, No 3. (1992): 159-178. 
 
Formosa Plastics Group. “About Formosa Plastics.” Accessed January 14, 2017. 
http://www.fpcusa.com/about.html 
 
Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer. "Investing in the Peace: Economic 
Interdependence and International Conflict." International Organization 55, 
no. 2 (2001): 391-438. 
 
 106 
Gelpi, Christopher F., and Joseph M. Grieco. "Democracy, Interdependence, and the 
Sources of the Liberal Peace." Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 1 (2008): 17-
36. 
 
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge University Press, 
1981.)   
 
Goddard, Stacie & Ronald R. Krebs “Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy,” 
Security Studies. 2015. 24:1, 5-36. 
 
Gold, Thomas B. State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. New York: East Gate 1986. 
 
Gonzales, Iris C. 25 November 2003. “Infrastructure, Security Woes Limit Investment 
(Despite 'Go South' rule, Taiwan firms not keen on RP)” BusinessWorld. 
Accessed January 15, 2017. 
 
Gries, Peter. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, (2004). 
 
Harding, Harry. "The Concept of "Greater China": Themes, Variations and 
Reservations." The China Quarterly, no. 136 (1993): 660-86. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/655587. 
 
He, Yinan. "Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan's Relations with China and 
Japan, 1895–2012." Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 3 (2014): 469-500. 
 
Holmes, Frank. “China’s New Special Economic Zone Evokes Memories of 
Shenzhen,” Forbes April 21, 2017. 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/04/21/chinas-new-
special-economic-zone-evokes-memories-of-shenzhen/#376053476f23 
 
Huang, Yiping, “China is a Special Developing Country.” The New York Times.  July 
27, 2015. https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/27/can-china-
stand-on-its-own/china-is-a-special-developing-country 
 
 Jakobsen, Jo and G. Jakobsen Tor. "Economic Nationalism and FDI: The Impact of 
Public Opinion on Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Markets, 1990-
2005." Society and Business Review 6, no. 1 (2011/02/08 2011): 61-76. 
 
Jervis, Robert. "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma." World Politics 30, no. 2 
(1978): 167-214.  
 
Jing, Bo-jiun. “Go South” Going South? Assessing Taiwan’s “New Southbound” 
Policy and the China Factor in Southeast Asia.” 
 
 107 
Juhász, Réka “Temporary protection and technology adoption: evidence from the 
Napoleonic blockade.” CEP discussion paper, CEPDP1322. Centre for 
Economic Performance (2004), London, UK. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch”. Trans. by M. Campbell 
Smith. London: Swan Sonnenschein, (1795). 
 
Kellas, James G. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. New York: St Martin’s 
Press, 1991. 51-52.   
 
Kelly, Matthew Kraig. “An Ambivalent Nation: Australian Nationalism and Historical 
Memory”. UCLA Historical Journal. 23, no. 1 (2012): 1-11. 
 
 Keohane, Robert E. and Joseph S. Nye. “Power and Interdependence” in Conflict 
After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace. (Routledge: New 
York, 1997)  
 
Krebs, Ronald R. “Tell Me a Story: FDR, Narrative, and the Making of the Second 
World War,” Security Studies. 2015. 24:1, 131-170. 
 
Kushner, Barak. "Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, 
Taiwan, and China since 1990." The International History Review 29, no. 4 
(2007): 793-820. 
 
“Lee Betrays Cause of Reunification” China Daily, June 24, 1995. Accessed February 
6, 2018. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/html/cd/1995/199507/19950724/199507
24004_1.html 
 
Leng, Tse-Kang. "Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations: The 
Role of Private Firms." Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (1998): 494-509. 
 
Lin, Syaru Shirley. Taiwan’s China Dilemma: Contested Identities and Multiple 
Interests in Taiwan’s Cross-Strait Economic Policy. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2016. 
 
Mclean-Dreyfus, Marie-Alice. “Taiwan: Is There A Political Generation Gap?”  Lowy 
Institute 9 June 2017. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/taiwan-
there-political-generation-gap.  
 
Mainland Affairs Council. 2001“Major Events Across the Taiwan Strait- 2001.” 
Accessed January 15,2017. 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1C6028CA080A27B3&sm
s=6F070A2443531120&s=3EF122092081EA37 
 
 108 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). “Act Governing Relations Between the People of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (old version).” July 1992. 
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=4F2E0C155DF44564&sm
s=2C46F5E37DC2E1D2&s=1A530DDE8A245DC0 
 
Mainland Affairs Council Public Opinion Polls. “Opinion Post.” 
http://www.mac.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=5895&mp=3. 
 
Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of Taiwan, “Cross-Strait Economic Statistics 
Monthly.” no. 169, table 10. 
http://ws.mac.gov.tw/001/Upload/OldFile/public/MMO/MAC/兩岸經濟統計
月報no.16910.pdf. 
 
Mitzen, Jennifer. “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the 
Security Dilemma.” 
 
Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan). August 26, 2001. “President 
Chen’s Remarks at the Closing of the EDAC.” Accessed January 15, 2017. 
http://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/755 
 
Pandya, Sonal S. "Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized 
Production in the Twenty-First Century." Annual Review of Political Science 
19, no. 1 (2016/05/11 2016): 455-75. 
 
Pajtinka, Erik. “Between Diplomacy and Paradiplomacy: Taiwan’s Foreign Relations 
in Current Practice,” Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics. 
11, no. 2 (2017): 39-57. https://doi.org/10.1515/jnmlp-2017-0003 
 
Peng, Ming-min.  A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader. 
New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 1972. 
 
Poznanski, Kazimierz Z. "Confucian Economics: The World at Work," World Review 
of Political Economy 6, no. 2 (2015): 208-51. 
 
Rosecrance, Richard, and Peter Thompson. "Trade, Foreign Investment, and Security." 
Annual Review of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2003/06/01 2003): 377-98. 
 
Ruggie, John Gerard. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge." International Organization 52, no. 4 
(1998): 855-85.  
 
Russett, Bruce M., and Oneal, John R. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations. New York: Norton, 2001. 
 
Sauvant, Karl P., “FDI Protectionism is on the Rise” (September 1, 2009). World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper Series, 1 September 2009. 
 109 
 
Scobell, Andrew. “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995-1996 
Taiwan Strait Crisis.” Political Science Quarterly 115, no. 2 (2000) 227-46. 
 
Sen, Amartya. “Development as Capability Expansion,” in The Community 
Development Reader edited by James Defilippis and Susan Saegert. (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 41-54. 
 
Shattuck, Thomas J. “Taiwan’s White Terror: Remembering the 228 Incident” 
Foreign Policy Research Institute. 27 February 2017. Accessed January 2018. 
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/02/taiwans-white-terror-remembering-228-
incident/. 
 
Smith, Anthony. Myth and Memories of the Nation. New York: Oxford. 1999. 10-12.  
 
Soh, C. Sarah. The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in 
Korea and Japan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. 
 
Steele, Brent. Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR 
State. New York: Routledge. 2008. 1-5. 
 
“Taiwan Demographics Profile 2018,” Index Mundi, January 20, 2018. Accessed 
February 12, 2018 
https://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/demographics_profile.html. 
 
Tien, Hung-Mao, and Chyuan-Jeng Shiau. "Taiwan's Democratization: A 
Summary." World Affairs 155, no. 2 (1992): 58-61. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20672340. 
 
Ting-Toomey, S. "Culture, Face Maintenance, and Styles of Handling Interpersonal 
Conflict: A Study in Five Cultures." International Journal of Conflict 
Management 2, no. 4 (1991): 275. 
 
UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012. United Nations: Geneva. 
 
United Nations. “Final outcome of the international conference on financing for 
development.” Paper presented at the UN Conference on Financing for 
Development, (March 2002) Monterrey, Mexico. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: 
Academic Press, 1976, 229-233. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. World-systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
 110 
Ward, Abigail. Postcolonial Traumas. Palgrave Macmillan: London. 2015. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of 
Power Politics.” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425. 
doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." International Security 20, no. 
1 (1995): 71-81.  
 
Werbner, Richard. 1998. “Smoke from the Barrel of a Gun: Postwars of the Dead, 
Memory and Reinscription in Zimbabwe.” In Werbner, R (ed). Memory and 
Post-colony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power. London: Zed.  
 
World Values Survey, Wave 3: Taiwan, 1995. 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp 
 
Yi, Kei-Mu. "Can Vertical Specialization Explain the Growth of World Trade?". 
Journal of Political Economy 111, no. 1 (2003/02/01 2003): 52-102. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
